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Abstract 
 
This thesis aims at assessing democratic consolidation in Croatia within the context of the 
EU accession negotiations in the past decade. It looks specifically at whether and to what 
extent the EU enlargement policies and political conditionality approach have been an 
effective tool in promoting democratic change and consolidation in Croatia, particularly 
in the following areas: cooperation with the ICTY, the fight against corruption, the 
consolidation of an independent judiciary, and fundamental rights, with special attention 
to freedom of expression. Thus, Croatia is referred to as an empirical case, but discussion 
can have wider appliance to other EU non-member states in Southeastern Europe and 
identify some of the advantages and shortcomings of the EU approach. Moreover, the 
country‟s specific features, such as the war of independence as well as Tudjman‟s 
personality and style of governance, have delayed taking up most of the democratic 
reforms and thus, have slowed down democratic change and consolidation for entire 
decade. In addition, the governments‟ hesitation to introduce necessary democratic 
reforms, due to domestic pressures of various interest groups has for a long time 
presented an important obstacle to any substantial changes and consolidation, as well as 
to Croatia‟s EU membership. Nevertheless, Croatia nowadays has achieved a stable and 
consolidated democracy, to which EU enlargement policies and its political 
conditionality have contributed significantly. Although there are still many problems to 
address, especially in terms of fight against corruption and war crimes issues, there is no 
direct threat from democratic breakdown or the erosion of democracy in the country. 
 
Key words: democratic consolidation, EU enlargement policies, EU political 
conditionality approach, Croatia.  
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Glossary 
 
Accession criteria (Copenhagen criteria) – Any country seeking the membership in the 
EU has to meet three criteria: political, economic and acceptance of the Acquis 
Communautaire. These criteria have been established by the Copenhagen European 
Council in 1993 and further strengthened by the Madrid European Council in 1995. 
 
Accession negotiations – Process of the adoption and implementation of the Acquis 
Communautaire, which is monitored by the European Commission (EC). The acquis is 
divided into chapters that cover all the areas the country must address in order to join the 
EU. Negotiations take place in intergovernmental conferences between the member states 
and the candidate country. 
 
Acquis Communautaire (Community acquis) – is the body of common rights and 
obligations which bind all the member states together within the EU. Candidate countries 
have to accept the acquis and transpose it into their national legislations before they can 
join the Union. 
 
‘Benchmarks’ – EU‟s measurable reference criteria defined for the opening and closing 
of Acquis Communautaire chapters. After the EU and the candidate country reach an 
agreement, the respective chapter is considered as temporarily closed. Thus, if new 
provisions are adopted or the candidate country does not persist with its obligations, the 
chapter in question can be reopened until the Accession Treaty is finally concluded. 
 
Candidate country – a country status that is conferred by the European Council on the 
basis of an opinion from the EC. The EC scrutinizes the country‟s application for 
membership in the light of the accession criteria and settles an opinion, while the 
accession process starts with the European Council‟s decision to open accession 
negotiations. Accession depends on the progress made by the respective candidate 
country, which is regularly assessed and monitored by the Commission. 
 xi 
Council of the European Union (‘Council of Ministers’ or ‘Council’) – is the EU‟s 
main decision-making body. The Council‟s meetings are attended by the EU member 
states ministers of various policy fields. Sessions are assembled by the rotating six-
months Presidency of Member State, which sets the meeting agenda. 
 
Enlargement policy – is the policy of further European integration and accession of new 
member states in the EU membership. Today, the EU counts 27 member states and its 
enlargement perspective is open to other European countries as well, when respective 
countries meet the necessary EU requirements. 
 
European Commission (EC) – is the EU institution that proposes and implements 
Community policies adopted by the Council and the Parliament. It is considered to be 
independent of national governments and is perceived as guardian of Community 
Treaties. It is comprised of 27 Commissioners. 
 
European Council – is the EU institution that defines general political guidelines and 
gives necessary impetus for EU development. It is comprised of the Heads of States and 
Governments of the Member States.  
 
PHARE program (Pologne-Hongrie: assistance à la restruration) – Program of 
Community aid to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the main financial and 
technical instrument of the EU‟s pre-accession strategy. Subsequently, it was extended to 
the Southeast European Countries and later on replaced with other aid programs. 
 
Stabilization and Association process (SAP) – the process that defines the EU‟s policy 
towards following countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, 
Montenegro and Serbia, as well as Kosovo. It was launched in order to strengthen 
democracy, the rule of law and the market economy, as well as to ensure peace and 
stability in the region. In addition, the SAP puts greater emphasis on the regional 
cooperation. 
Source: European Union, Glossary, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/index_a_en.htm  
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 1 
1. Introduction 
 
After the breakdown of communist regimes throughout Europe, post-communist states 
have faced a challenge to build and develop new modern and democratic societies. Since 
the early 1990‟s these countries have been going through a process of transformation 
from communism toward liberal democracies, trying to consolidate their democratic 
systems. At the same time, the process of democratization has been closely related to the 
process of Europeanization. Thus, the role model in the process of setting up a liberal, 
democratic polity and a free market economy has been primarily West European 
countries and organizations, first and foremost the European Union (EU) and its 
predecessor the European Community (EC). Moreover, the Euro-Atlantic region set out 
different tools in order to promote and support democratic consolidation in new 
democratic states.
1
 The phrase that has frequently been used to describe the transition 
from communism to democracy is „return to Europe‟, which refers to implementation of 
different European policies and democratic reforms as well as full integration into 
Western organizations, namely the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO).
2
 In that sense, Croatia has been no exception to this rule. However, having in 
mind the country‟s recent history and its war of independence3, we may observe that 
Croatia‟s pathway toward democratic consolidation and Western organizations‟ 
membership appeared to be more difficult than it was initially expected. 
Therefore, keeping in mind the country‟s specific features, this thesis aims at 
assessing the progress of democratic consolidation in Croatia within the context of the 
EU accession negotiations in the past decade. The thesis will analyze major challenges 
the country has faced and look specifically at the impact of the EU enlargement policies 
and political conditionality approach on democratic consolidation in Croatia. In addition, 
it will observe how different Croatian governments have responded to EU requirements 
and consider whether and to what extent the EU approach has been an effective 
                                                 
1
 Frank Schimmelfennig, „European Regional Organizations, Political Conditionality and Democratic 
Transformation in Eastern Europe‟, East European Politics and Societies, 21: 1 (2007) 126-141. 
2
 Sharon Fisher, Political Change in Post-Communist Slovakia and Croatia: From Nationalist to 
Europeanist, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, pp. 3. 
3
 In Croatia known as 'Homeland war' (Domovinski rat) or „Great-Serbian aggression‟ (Velikosrpska 
agresija) and in international literature often referred as „Yugoslav wars‟ or „War of Yugoslav Succession‟. 
In this thesis I will use the term the War of Independence. 
 2 
instrument in promoting democratic changes in the country. In order to do that, the thesis 
aims to consider the state of play in the following areas particularly: cooperation with the 
ICTY, the fight against corruption, the consolidation of an independent judiciary, and 
fundamental rights, with special attention to freedom of expression. These areas are 
primarily included in the Chapter 23 of the Acquis Communautaire – „Judiciary and 
Fundamental Rights‟, which is crucial for the outcome of the whole accession 
negotiations process. Moreover, these particular issues have often been pointed out as 
areas Croatia needs to handle correctly in order to join the EU and, at the same time, have 
been for many governments painful to deal with. 
Having this in mind, it is possible to observe that the process of democratic 
consolidation in Croatia largely overlaps with the country‟s accession to the EU and that 
these two processes are closely related. In this thesis, I will argue that the EU‟s 
enlargement policies and political conditionality approach have had a significant impact 
on democratic changes and consolidation in the country. In my view, some of the issues 
that are crucial for country‟s democratic consolidation, such as the rule of law and the 
fight against corruption, were closely addressed only after the EU has exerted its pressure 
on Croatian governments. Furthermore, due to domestic pressures of various interest 
groups, the governments have often been unwilling to proceed with necessary political 
and social reforms and have resisted complying with EU requirements. In addition, some 
factors specific to Croatia, such as the war of independence as well as the legacy of its 
first president, Franjo Tudjman, have delayed taking up most of the political and social 
reform issues and thus, have slowed down democratic changes and consolidation in the 
country for entire decade. Finally, the EU enlargement policies and its approach have 
evolved in the past years and thus, Croatia has had to meet different standards, which 
were not previously required. Perhaps general promises remained similar as in previous 
enlargements, but EU criteria and actual performance toughened, mostly due to some 
unpleasant experiences in connection with the 2004, and especially the 2007 EU 
enlargement. These specific circumstances for a long time presented the main obstacle to 
substantial democratic changes and consolidation, and to the EU membership. Thus, after 
briefly summarizing main features of modern Croatian history, I will evaluate possible 
theoretical approaches and then define the framework for further analysis. 
 3 
1.1 Background and relevance: Croatia and the EU 
Croatia is a small European country that gained its independence after the disintegration 
of Yugoslavia in the course of 1988-91.
4
 The first multiparty elections were held in May 
1990 and the victory of Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica – 
HDZ) and its leader Franjo Tudjman signified a first step toward Croatian independence. 
After a public referendum in 1991, when a majority of Croatian citizens voted for an 
independent state
5
, the Croatian Parliament (Sabor) adopted the Constitutional Decision 
on the Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic of Croatia, on 25 June 1991. By 
that point, the country was already facing a well-organized rebellion of its local Serb 
community as well as Serbia‟s aggression, openly supported by Yugoslav People‟s Army 
(Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija – JNA). 
During the first years of independence, Croatia suffered a great amount of 
destruction and devastation. The country had faced occupation of one third of its 
territory, around 15,000 dead and 6,000 missing persons, as well as more than 500,000 
internally displaced persons and refugees between the 1991 and 1995. Moreover, the 
entire economy suffered from deprivation, especially in tourism and investments, and a 
large proportion of property and infrastructure was destroyed, causing an economic 
damage of almost 19 billion US dollars.
6
 In addition, the loss of human capital and deep 
structural change of leaders in public administration, judiciary and enterprise resulted in a 
decline of quality in these sectors in the years afterwards.
7
 At the same time, the new 
circumstances in Southeastern Europe at the beginning of the 1990s left the international 
community somewhat unprepared. While it failed to respond in an appropriate way, 
according to Goldstein, the EC and the United Nations (UN) must take part of the blame 
for these events because they (1) naively believed that a European approach based on 
economic interest and diplomacy would be acceptable to all sides, (2) treated the victim 
                                                 
4
 For more details on Croatia‟s history, see Appendix I. 
5
 The referendum was held on 19 May 1991 with the turnout of almost 80 per cent, of which around 95 per 
cent voted for independence. At the same time, it was largely boycotted by Serb community. For more 
details on referendum and election results, see Appendix II. 
6
 OSCE, Mission to Croatia, „Report on Croatia‟s progress in meeting international commitments since 
2001‟, 9 June 2006, 1-35, pp. 34. More on this also in Fisher, Political Change, pp. 179. 
7
 Many Serbs as well as Croats who were not loyal to the ruling party were dismissed from their duties 
regardless their education. More on this in Bruno Schönfelder, „The Impact of the War on the Economy‟, in 
Sabrina P. Ramet, Konrad Clewing and Reneo Lukić (eds) Croatia since Independence: War, Politics, 
Society, Foreign Relations, München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2008, pp. 219. 
 4 
and aggressor as equivalent for a long time and (3) supported the existence of a fictional 
Yugoslavia, even at a time when it was obvious that the state had already collapsed.
8
 In 
early 1992 the international community eventually recognized Croatia as an independent 
state, treating the occupied territory as an integral part of the country. Shortly thereafter, 
Croatia became a member of the UN and some other international organizations. 
Although the war of independence ended in 1995, it took an additional three years 
for the country to consolidate its territory. In 1998, with the peaceful reintegration of 
Danube region (Podunavlje) in Eastern Slavonia into the Croatian constitutional and legal 
system, the country finally established its territorial integrity. However, mainly due to the 
impact of the war and the mismanaged privatization process of state enterprises, Croatia‟s 
economy was in a poor condition and by the end of 1998, it entered into deep recession. 
Moreover, unemployment was gradually rising, reaching 20.1 per cent in 1999.
9
 In 
addition, there were growing allegations of corruption and misuse of government powers 
as well as a sense of international isolation, since Croatia was excluded from the 1997 
decisions on EU and NATO enlargement. All this created a vast proportion of 
dissatisfaction and frustration among Croatian citizens. As a result, in the 2000 
Parliamentary elections, Croatian citizens decided to vote the ruling HDZ out of power 
and voted for the left-oriented coalition led by the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and 
Ivica Raĉan. It was predominantly the bad economic situation in the country, and 
especially the fall in living standards that brought about the change of power. 
At the same time, the beginning of the new decade brought some important 
changes regarding the Croatian international position. In the new circumstances, where 
Raĉan‟s government was more willing to introduce necessary democratic reforms, the 
country moved quickly towards European integration. In 2003, Croatia submitted its 
application for membership in the EU. However, Raĉan‟s government was constantly 
struggling with important domestic issues and the strength of the six-party coalition was 
often put to the test. The alliance was badly shaken when the SDP‟s chief coalition 
partner, Draţen Budiša and his Croatian Social Liberal Party (Hrvatska socijalno 
liberalna stranka – HSLS), left the government due to disagreement regarding 
                                                 
8
 Ivo Goldstein, Croatia: A History, translated from Croatian by Nikolina Jovanović, London: C. Hurst and 
Company, 1999, pp. 222. 
9
 IMF, „Republic of Croatia: Staff Report for 1999‟, Report No. 00/7, January 2000. 
 5 
cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 
Moreover, although the economy experienced some positive changes during the early 
2000‟s, in terms of GDP growth and inflation, some problems such as unemployment 
remained, and the external state debt increased.
10
 The overall impression was that the 
government had failed to stimulate economic recovery and improve people‟s living 
standards. In the meantime, after the intra-party elections and the victory of Ivo Sanader, 
the HDZ reformed itself and succeeded in presenting itself as a modern European 
democratic party. In the 2003 Parliamentary elections, the HDZ came back to power and 
Ivo Sanader became the new Croatian prime minister. The new government continued 
with the pro-European policy and in 2004, Croatia was granted the status of an EU 
candidate country. Even though cooperation with the ICTY was a heavy burden for 
Sanader‟s government as well, the country succeeded in opening EU accession 
negotiations in October 2005. 
After the change of state power in 2000, it was expected that Croatia would take 
the fast track toward EU membership. However, this was not the case. The country 
missed the opportunity to become a member state in both the 2004 and 2007 
enlargements and in 2011 it entered into its sixth year of negotiations. While there are 
frequent announcements from Croatian government officials as well as some high-
ranking politicians from the EU member states that Croatia is in the final stage of its 
accession talks, the EU officials seem to be more cautious in their prediction of the end of 
negotiations. The latest statements by Croatian prime minister Jadranka Kosor,
11
 that the 
country has a real chance to complete negotiation talks by the end of June 2011, show a 
considerable amount of optimism on her part.
12
 Moreover, during his official visit to 
Zagreb in February 2011, Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbàn, explicitly said that 
Croatia would get the date for the end of EU negotiation talks during his country‟s EU 
presidency.
13
 It is possible to observe Croatia‟s considerable democratic improvements in 
the past years, especially regarding the EU political criteria. These improvements were 
                                                 
10
 IMF, „Republic of Croatia: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix‟, Report No. 04/251, August 2004. 
11
 After Sanader's resignation in July 2009, Jadranka Kosor became the new Croatian prime minister. 
12
 Veĉernji list, 15 February 2011, „Odluka o završetku pregovora‟, http://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/odluka-
zavrsetku-pregovora-eu-mozda-vec-3-ozujka-clanak-253180 (accessed in March 2011)  
13
 Hungary is chairing the EU presidency in the period January-July 2011; Vjesnik, 8 February 2011, 
„Orbàn: U travnju datum završetka pregovora‟, http://www.vjesnik.hr/Article.aspx?ID=68939940-E070-
4526-8B1B-70100BBF6D31 (accessed in March 2011) 
 6 
also recognized in the latest EC Report stating that democracy and rule of law in the 
country have been further strengthened.
14
 On the other hand, although the leader of the 
European People‟s Party (EPP) and representative in the European Parliament (EP) 
Joseph Daul declared his support for Croatia‟s membership, he also warned that the 
country had to continue with the necessary reforms in the judiciary and in the fight 
against corruption.
15
 A similar warning was enunciated by EU Commissioner for 
Enlargement Štefan Füle, who emphasized that “Croatia needs to focus in particular on 
fulfilling all the closing benchmarks of Chapter 23 – Judiciary and Fundamental 
Rights.”16 As previously mentioned, the Chapter 23 of the Acquis Communautaire is 
crucial for the outcome of the whole accession negotiations process, and the issues it 
covers are particularly important for country‟s democratic consolidation. 
 
1.2. Previous research and Research questions 
In the past two decades, there have been growing number of research studies examining 
the democratic transformation of post-communist states. Moreover, special attention has 
been paid by some observers to the possible impact of the EU, its integration process and 
enlargement policy on domestic transformation towards democracy and market economy 
in these countries. The research on the phenomenon of globalization and regionalization 
as well as on the significance of global and regional players, such as the EU, is on the 
increase in the past two decades. These players regulate and manage various fields of 
political and economic activity, especially through their institutional structure.
17
 In that 
sense, various articles focused on direct EU influence on domestic transformation within 
particular legal framework, such as: the Association Agreement (AA), the Stabilization 
and Association Agreement (SAA) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 
However, most of the research has focused on Central Europe and thus, Croatia and other 
                                                 
14
 EC, Conclusions on Croatia, extract from the Communication from the Commission to the Council and 
the European Parliament, „Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2010-2011‟, COM (2010) 660. 
15
 Vjesnik, 28 February 2011, 'Joseph Daul: Hrvatska će ove godine dobiti datum ulaska u EU', 
http://www.vjesnik.hr/Article.aspx?ID=A49DB7EA-F105-4132-8453-427B99F3BED7 (accessed in March 
2011) 
16
 Veĉernji list, 15 February 2011, „Odluka o završetku pregovora‟ http://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/odluka-
zavrsetku-pregovora-eu-mozda-vec-3-ozujka-clanak-253180 (accessed in March 2011) 
17
 More on this in Chamsy el-Ojeili and Patrick Hayden, Critical Theories of Globalization, New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, pp. 96-98, and in Ben Rosamond, Theories of European Integration, New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000, pp. 179-185. 
 7 
post-Yugoslav successor states are mostly excluded from such studies. The main reason 
was that, due to specific circumstances in the 1990s, these countries firstly had to define 
their statehood and territorial sovereignty, which slowed down democratic processes and 
postponed their democratic consolidation for an entire decade.
18
 Moreover, a lot of 
previous research on post-Yugoslav successor states focused mainly on the establishment 
of democracy and on transformation from a communist to a democratic system, 
overlooking developments and consolidation of these democracies afterwards. Yet, as 
Schedler argues, “sustaining democracy is often a task as difficult as establishing it.”19 
Having that in mind, this thesis provides an added value to the research on 
democratic changes and consolidation in Croatia, by examining different events that have 
occurred in the past decade. Thus, the thesis will analyze major challenges the country 
has faced and assess the progress of democratic consolidation in Croatia within the 
context of the EU accession negotiations. Furthermore, the thesis will assess whether and 
to what extent the EU enlargement policy and its political conditionality approach has 
been an effective tool in promoting democratic change and consolidation in Croatia. As 
Fisher argues, although other international actors have been important in stimulating 
change in newly independent states, the EU has undoubtedly served as the most 
important one.
20
 At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that the EU‟s influence 
as such is questionable, since it varies across countries and policy areas and is never 
straightforward. Moreover, even if direct EU influence exists, it does not necessarily 
mean it is entirely positive for a country‟s democratic consolidation.21 
Therefore, the main research question of this study is: Whether and to what extent 
has the EU enlargement policy and its political conditionality approach been an effective 
tool in promoting democratic change and consolidation in Croatia? To be able to answer 
this question, several additional operational questions give structure to this thesis: First, 
                                                 
18
 Danijela Dolenc, „Europeanization as a Democratising Force in Postcommunist Europe: Croatia in 
Comparative Perspective‟, Political Thought: Croatian Political Science Review, 5 (2008) 23-46. 
19
 Andreas Schedler, „What is Democratic Consolidation?‟, Journal of Democracy 9:2 (1998) 91-107, pp. 
91. 
20
 Fisher, Political Change, pp. 173. 
21
 In Haughton‟s opinion, the EU‟s fast-track mechanisms can bypass normal procedures of democratic 
processes, since candidate states are forced to accept and implement lots of new regulations in a short 
period of time, which can be contra productive. Tim Haughton, „When Does the EU Make a Difference? 
Conditionality and the Accession Process in Central and Eastern Europe‟, Political Studies Review, 5 
(2007) 233-246, pp. 519. 
 8 
what were the main features of Croatia‟s domestic transformation since 2000? Second, 
what were the major EU requirements in Croatian accession negotiations? Thirdly, what 
were the internal factors that can explain government‟s resistance to or acceptance of EU 
requirements? And finally, how has this affected democratic changes and consolidation in 
Croatia?  
In order to answer these questions, the thesis aims to assess democratic changes 
and consolidation in Croatia as well as to consider the state of play in the following areas 
particularly: cooperation with the ICTY, the fight against corruption, the consolidation of 
an independent judiciary, and fundamental rights, with special attention to freedom of 
expression. Although there are other factors that might have influenced democratic 
changes and consolidation in Croatia as well as areas in which this could be observed, it 
is beyond the scope of this study to go into all of them. I justify the above mentioned 
selection by the following: these are the questions that were politically most controversial 
and were mostly preoccupying public and media attention, were repeatedly used as a 
reason for raising tensions and hot debates within the country and were often painful for 
many governments to deal with them. In addition, they also received the most emphasis 
on the EU side. These issues have often been pointed out as those that need to be handled 
correctly in order for Croatia to join the EU. They are primarily included in Chapter 23 of 
the Acquis Communautaire, which is crucial for the outcome of the whole accession 
negotiation process and clearly indicates the importance of the rule of law. As Linz and 
Stepan argue, “the modern Rechtsstaat is a fundamental in making democratization 
possible, since without it citizens would not be able to exercise their political rights with 
full freedom and independence”22, which then makes a nomocracy and institutions that 
function according to the principle of law essential for the consolidation of democracy. 
At the same time, as Ramet and Wagner point out, “corruption is the inverse measure of 
the rule of law…the more corruption there is, the less a system may be said to function 
according to the rule of law.”23 Moreover, the new actors that have emerged in the past 
years, such as various non-governmental organizations and interest groups became more 
                                                 
22
 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, „Toward Consolidated Democracies‟, Journal of Democracy, 7: 2 (1996) 
14-33, pp. 19. 
23
 Sabrina P. Ramet and Peter F. Wagner, „Post-socialist models of rule in Central and Southeastern 
Europe‟, in Sabrina P. Ramet (ed.) Central and Southeast European Politics since 1989, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 19.  
 9 
influential in traditional political forums and strengthened the global discourse of human 
rights.
24
 The role of the media and freedom of expression in contemporary democracies is 
of great importance as well, since media are expected to be able to provide a forum for 
public dialogue, a diversity of ideas and tolerance for the opinion of others.
25
 Thus, only 
free media can guarantee a free society, and operate as a valuable corrective of state 
authorities. 
At the same time, this thesis will examine how different Croatian governments 
have responded to a range of EU requirements and assess whether and to what extent 
these concerns have affected democratic reforms in the country. Having in mind the 
duration of its accession talks with the EU, Croatia presents an exception in comparison 
with previous EU candidate states that finished their negotiation talks in a relatively short 
time after these were officially opened. However, it is not only Croatia that takes the 
responsibility for the long accession period. The EU constitutional crisis, as well as what 
we call „enlargement fatigue‟ may be given part of the blame too. In that sense, both have 
threatened to undermine the credibility of the EU membership, and have raised some 
questions about the future effectiveness of the EU enlargement policies and political 
conditionality approach.
26
 Still, the impact of the EU constitutional crisis and so-called 
„enlargement fatigue‟ on Croatia‟s negotiations is beyond the scope of this study.  
However, the thesis will take into consideration the transformation of EU 
enlargement policy and political conditionality approach in the past years. In 2008, the 
Commission established the so-called „benchmarks‟ that a candidate country needed to 
fulfill in order to open and close negotiation chapters. Moreover, Chapter 23 was not part 
of the previous negotiation framework between the candidate states and the EU. But, at 
this point in time, the EU expects the new potential member states to completely meet the 
EU criteria even prior to formal membership. In that sense, Croatian governments have 
faced different challenges and need to fulfill different accession standards in comparison 
to states admitted in previous enlargements. And finally, particular attention will be paid 
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to Croatia‟s specific features, such as the war of independence as well as the legacy of its 
first president Franjo Tudjman which, in my view, have delayed taking up most of the 
democratic reforms and thus, have slowed down democratic changes and consolidation in 
the country, and affected Croatia‟s accession process. 
 
1.3. Structure and Main arguments 
As aforementioned, the thesis will analyze major challenges the country has faced in the 
past decade and look specifically at the impact of the EU enlargement policies and 
political conditionality approach on democratic consolidation in Croatia. Subsequently, I 
will firstly evaluate possible theoretical approaches as well as methodology, and then 
define the framework for further analysis. Afterwards, I will briefly assess the era of 
Croatia‟s first president Franjo Tudjman, from 1990-1999. Special attention will be paid 
to the impact of war of independence and Tudjman‟s personality and style of governance 
on democratic reforms and consolidation in the country. I will evaluate how these factors 
affected his decisions in the area of European integration issues and particularly in 
relation to cooperation with the ICTY, the fight against corruption, the consolidation of 
an independent judiciary and fundamental rights, with special attention to freedom of 
expression, and whether the EU political conditionality approach had been an effective 
tool in promoting democratic reforms in Tudjman‟s time. 
Then, I will focus on political and social challenges and changes that have 
occurred from 2000 onwards, under the prime ministerships‟ of Ivica Raĉan (2000-2003), 
Ivo Sanader (2003-2009) and Jadranka Kosor (from 2009 till present), addressing the 
same areas of interest. Finally, I will examine the consequences of Tudjman‟s legacy for 
post-Tudjman‟s Croatia as well as the impact of EU‟s enlargement policy and political 
conditionality approach on democratic changes and consolidation in the country. Hence, I 
expect that this thesis will also identify the advantages and shortcomings of the EU 
enlargement policy and political conditionality approach towards Croatia and other 
Southeast European non-member states, as well as suggest possible future trends in that 
field. In that sense, it can look beyond the specific country and the group of current 
membership candidates and provide a set of political recommendations for other potential 
EU candidate states. 
 11 
2. Theoretical framework and Methodology  
 
The thesis will analyze democratic changes and consolidation in Croatia under the 
theoretical framework of democratic consolidation and EU political conditionality 
approach. Firstly, it is important to define what I mean by the term „democratic 
consolidation‟ and in what particular way I will use it. Afterwards, I will provide a closer 
explanation of EU‟s „political conditionality approach‟.  
 
2.1. Democratic consolidation 
The term democratic consolidation in its various models has been used more frequently 
in the recent years. Initially, the concept was used in order to explain the challenge of 
making new and fragile democracies secure and protected from potential risk of 
authoritarian regression.
27
 Thus, a consolidated democracy was one that was unlikely to 
break down.  
However, over the years, new conceptual meanings were gradually added to the 
concept and consolidated democracy started to include: the rule of law, state bureaucracy, 
an institutionalized economic society, relatively autonomous political society, and a 
lively civil society.
28
 This makes the concept somewhat vague and open-ended. Since 
new requirements can continually be added, the concept itself would become a moving 
target and no democracy would ever be considered entirely consolidated.
29
 Thus, 
Schedler argues that democratic consolidation became not only a cluster concept but also 
“a garbage-can concept, catch-all concept lacking a core meaning that would unite all 
models of usage.”30 Because of this conceptual confusion, some scholars alerted others to 
the danger of using the concept in a random way, depending on the appropriateness of the 
particular research area. The problem that appears is a conceptual disorder which 
represents a powerful barrier to theory building, since there is a strong tendency toward 
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the accumulation of different requirements and escalation of new conditions in order to 
define the concept.
31
 
Thus, some scholars prefer a narrow explanation of democratic consolidation. In 
Schedler‟s view, democratic consolidation is primarily related to democratic survival and, 
therefore, includes negative notions, above all avoiding democratic breakdown and 
avoiding democratic erosion. Avoiding democratic breakdown primarily refers to 
preventing authoritarian regression and a „quick death‟ of democracy. Scholars who 
perceive democratic consolidation in this way are mostly concerned with fear of a new 
democratic order reverting to authoritarianism. Once democracy is established and the 
transition from authoritarian rule has reached the point where the rule of law has been 
established and free, fair and competitive elections are held, the main focus moves from 
establishing democracy‟s core institutions to securing what has been achieved. In that 
sense, democratic consolidation refers to reducing the probability of its breakdown and 
this branch focuses mostly on democratic sustainability and keeping democracy alive.
32
  
The concept can also be used in terms of avoiding democratic erosion, which 
refers to preventing the erosion of fundamental democratic features and a „slow death‟ of 
democracy. In this case, scholars are mostly concerned about the threat of a silent and 
gradual regression of democracy to semi-democratic rule. This represents a less 
transparent but at the same time a more dangerous type of weakening of a new 
democratic society. As Huntington argues, “a serious threat to democracy is executive 
arrogation, which occurs when an elected chief executive concentrates power in his own 
hands, subordinates or even suspends the legislature, and rules largely by decree.”33 This 
was largely the case in Croatia during the 1990‟s and Tudjman‟s term in office. 
At the same time, Linz and Stepan argue that three minimum conditions have to 
be fulfilled in order to be able to speak about democratic consolidation: condition of 
sovereignty, a completed democratic transition and a government that rules 
democratically.
34
 Thus, in order to speak about democratic consolidation a state as such 
has to exist, as well as some basic principles of democracy and a government that is 
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ready to comply with these principles. In the case of Croatia, the issue of sovereignty was 
not resolved until 1998, when the country established its territorial integrity by the 
peaceful reintegration of the Danube region (Podunavlje) in Eastern Slavonia into the 
Croatian constitutional and legal system. Accordingly, Linz and Stepan define 
consolidated democracy as a “political regime in which democracy…has become, in a 
phrase, „the only game in town‟.”35 Having this in mind, in order to assess democratic 
consolidation in Croatia, I will rely on initial explanations of the concept and consider its 
negative notions. Thus, I will observe democratic consolidation in terms of democratic 
breakdown and especially in terms of the danger of gradual erosion of democratic 
principles. 
Beside the problem of conceptualization, another issue is related to the problem of 
operationalization and measurement of democratic consolidation. According to Schedler, 
in order to measure democratic consolidation in a given country, it is necessary to 
theorize about democratic stability. In addition, we have to include both factual evidence 
and causal arguments, and thus, need a causal theory that will explain how something 
effects regime stability in the given context.
36
As Schedler further argues, there are three 
dimensions used as basic approaches/operational indicators in order to measure 
democratic consolidation: the behavioural, attitudinal and constitutional dimensions. At 
the same time, these dimensions represent different levels of causation and form a chain 
of causation: 
 
structural contexts → actors and attitudes → behavior → democratic stability.37 
 
Behaviorally, democracy is consolidated when there are no significant political or 
other actors with a considerable amount of support who try to overthrow the democratic 
regime and achieve their goals by creating a non-democratic regime. In this case, all 
relevant actors obey the basic rules of democratic game and their loyalty to democracy is 
not questionable. Thus, it is possible to expect they would continue such practice in the 
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foreseeable future and that democracy became „the only game in town‟.38 Attitudinally, 
democracy is consolidated when the majority of people, even at a time of economic crisis 
and deep dissatisfaction, believe that any political change must come within the 
constraints of democratic procedures. It is unlikely that democracy would break down if a 
widespread democratic consensus is present. In other words, it is important how people 
understand democracy, since “the success of democratization depends on the awareness 
and behavior of the citizens.”39 Constitutionally, democracy is consolidated when both 
governmental and nongovernmental forces accept the established norms as the only way 
to resolve a political conflict and perceive violations of these norms as unproductive and 
costly. In this case, a democratic regime is based on solid structural foundations and is 
likely to survive.
40
 All three dimensions will be taken into consideration in this thesis. 
However, special attention will be paid to the behavioral dimension, since “democracy is 
neither a divine gift nor a side effect of societal factors, it is the work of political 
actors.”41 
 
2.2. Political conditionality approach 
According to Schimmelfennig, “political conditionality is a strategy of reinforcement 
used by international organizations and other international actors to bring about and 
stabilize political change at the state level.”42 After the fall of the communist regimes in 
Europe, different international and regional organizations have used a political 
conditionality approach in order to induce and strengthen democracy in newly 
independent states and to promote democratic change as well as universal values, such as: 
the rule of law, market economy, human rights, etc. The basic principle by which the 
political conditionality operates is usually called the „carrot and stick‟ approach. In that 
sense, the international organization offers certain benefits to a target state, such as 
financial assistance, market access or membership, in order for a target state to comply 
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with the organization‟s requirements. If the target state does not comply with these 
requirements, the international organization withholds potential benefits.
43
 The question, 
then, is to what extent this approach, in particular the EU‟s political conditionality, is 
effective in bringing democratic change to new democracies. Some scholars argue that 
the effectiveness depends on three core conditions: the size of international rewards, the 
size of domestic adoption costs and the credibility of the political conditionality.
44
  
In terms of rewards, Schimmelfennig argues that the impact of the political 
conditionality on democratic change is low when international and regional 
organizations, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
or the Council of Europe, do not have any concrete political or material incentives to 
offer but rely primarily on their knowledge and social benefits. On the other hand, the 
impact on democratic change is quite high when international and regional organizations, 
such as the EU and NATO offer concrete political and material benefits in terms of 
membership in those organizations and set the certain requirements as a precondition of 
accession and full membership.
45
 At the same time, governments will be more reluctant 
to comply with certain requirements if these present a risk to maintain their power, as in a 
case where coalition partners threaten to leave the government.
46
 In Croatia, this was the 
case when Draţen Budiša and his party, the HSLS threatened to leave the coalition 
government due to a disagreement regarding Croatian cooperation with the ICTY in 
2002. In this sense, it is important that the size of international rewards exceed the size of 
domestic adoption costs.  
Looking in terms of international rewards and domestic costs, it is possible to 
argue that the EU‟s enlargement policy and its political conditionality approach have the 
potential to be successful in bringing about democratic change. However, it is important 
that these policies are at the same time credible, which means that all requirements have 
to be transparent, determinate and consistent. The candidate state must be sure that, if it 
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complies with certain requirements, the EU will deliver promised benefits.
47
 In this sense, 
EU membership has some strong benefits, but it is necessary to keep both the 
requirements and the accession perspective reliable. This was not the case in the year 
2005 and afterwards, due to the EU constitutional crisis. The widespread impression was: 
no new constitution, no further enlargement. The general opinion was that the EU had 
expanded too far and too fast and thus, needed time to consolidate within. 
At the same time, Haughton argues that the impact of the EU‟s political 
conditionality approach on democratic changes and consolidation is limited and depends 
on the particular phase of EU accession negotiations and the particular policy area.
48
 The 
governments will be more eager to comply with
 
the requirements at the moment when the 
EU is about to decide on opening or concluding accession negotiations. Thus, Sanader‟s 
government was more eager to cooperate with the ICTY in 2005, in order to open 
accession negotiations while Kosor‟s government is more eager to resolve the corruption 
issue in order to conclude accession negotiations by the end of June 2011. In addition, 
Sedelmeier argues that, in many policy areas of Southeast European countries, the EU 
requirements “touch directly on questions of national identity and statehood, and its 
demands more directly threaten the political support for governments.”49 Having this in 
mind, in order to understand the possible compliance or resistance to EU‟s political 
conditionality, it is important to go beyond material factors. This was especially the case 
during Raĉan‟s term in office, when a coalition government was badly shaken by mass 
protests of veteran movements and right-wing opposition parties, because of cooperation 
with the ICTY. 
Another important condition in the EU political conditionality approach is the 
existence of a liberal party constellation, which means that all relevant parties in the 
country base their programs on liberal reform and integration into Western associations.
50
 
In that sense, if all relevant parties in the country support liberal reforms and integration 
into the EU, then the liberal party constellation will further increase the effectiveness of 
                                                 
47
 Schimmelfennig, European Regional, pp. 131; Sedelmeier, The EU and Democratization, in Ramet (ed.) 
Central and Southeast, pp. 524. 
48
 Haughton, When Does the EU, pp. 235. 
49
 Sedelmeier, The EU and Democratization, in Ramet (ed.) Central and Southeast, pp. 531. 
50
 Schimmelfennig, European Regional, pp. 132; Sedelmeier, The EU and Democratization, in Ramet (ed.) 
Central and Southeast, pp. 526. 
 17 
the EU‟s political conditionality, which in this case will be high. As Schimmelfennig 
explains, countries with a liberal party constellation, such as the Czech Republic, 
Slovenia and Poland experienced a rapid and smooth process of democratic consolidation 
and succeeded in achieving strong compatibility with Western democratic standards.
51
 
Thus, liberal parties must be domestically dominant in order for the EU to affect 
democratic changes in the country. 
On the other hand, in the case of an anti-liberal party constellation, when all 
relevant parties base their programs on anti-liberal, nationalist or communist ideologies, 
support for liberal reform and integration into EU will be low and thus, the impact of the 
EU‟s political conditionality will be low as well. In countries with anti-liberal party 
constellations, such was Serbia between March 2004 and July 2008 and Ukraine until 
2004, political conditionality had little impact since domestic political costs of adopting 
democratic norms and Western standards are normally high.
52
 And finally, in the case of 
a mixed party constellation, where liberal and anti-liberal parties compete for political 
power, such was Serbia between October 2000 and March 2004, the impact of EU 
political conditionality could still be high. However, democratic transformation based on 
so called „stop-and-go‟ or „up-and-down pattern‟ will not be as rapid and smooth as in the 
case of countries with liberal party constellation.
53
  
Nevertheless, democratic reforms conducted during the liberal parties‟ terms and 
their Western integration policies create a certain lock-in effect and path dependency. In 
this case, populist parties very often reform themselves into new modern European 
parties, equally pro-EU as liberal parties. When they come back to power, they usually 
stay on the same course as liberal parties previously. Eventually, this can lead to a change 
of party constellation from mixed to liberal.
54
 The 2000 elections in Croatia and victory 
of the left-oriented coalition have produced this kind of lock-in effect and path 
dependency. It forced the HDZ to reform itself into a modern European democratic party 
                                                 
51
 Schimmelfennig, European Regional, pp.133. However, Sedelmeier offers different point of view by 
arguing that these countries started to democratize and consolidate their democracies without EU pressure, 
and therefore, it is hard to believe they would not achieve this goal without the EU. Sedelmeier, The EU 
and Democratization, in Ramet (ed.) Central and Southeast, pp. 527. 
52
 Schimmelfennig, European Regional, pp. 134; Sedelmeier, The EU and Democratization, in Ramet (ed.) 
Central and Southeast, pp. 528; Dolenc, Europeanization, pp. 37. 
53
 Schimmelfennig, European Regional, pp. 134. 
54
 Ibid, pp. 135; Dolenc, Europeanization, pp. 37. 
 18 
and, after coming back to power in 2003, it continued with the pro-European policy and 
necessary reforms.  
Having this in mind, it appears that the EU and its political conditionality 
approach cannot produce democratic change and consolidate democratic systems by 
itself. Thus, the strength of the political conditionality depends on the country‟s 
motivation to accept and implement or resist and reject EU requirements. If the country is 
willing to accept EU requirements, the impact of the political conditionality on 
democratic change will be high and the country will go relatively smoothly through the 
process of democratic consolidation. On the other hand, if the country is not willing to 
comply with EU requirements, the impact of the political conditionality on democratic 
change will be low and the country will need additional time to consolidate 
democratically. As Haughton argues, a lot depends “on the clarity of demands, the tying 
of rewards to progress made and receptive domestic political elite.”55  
 
2.3. Methods and Methodology  
This study is a primarily a case study in democratic transformation, discussing 
democratic changes and consolidation in Croatia over the past decade and the impact of 
EU enlargement policy and its political conditionality approach. Thus, Croatia will be 
referred to as an empirical case, but discussion can have wider appliance to all EU non-
member states in Southeastern Europe, since a case study “seeks to move from a purely 
empirical level of exposition to a level of general statements.”56 Although one specific 
empirical case cannot provide a basis for any general statements, it is possible to broaden 
the empirical focus. Thus, this case study provides an opportunity for deep and intensive 
examination of democratic changes and consolidation over longer period of time and 
through several policy areas and thus, seeks to draw some tendencies in the EU‟s 
enlargement policies and political conditionality approach as well as in its impact on 
democratic changes and consolidation in the country. 
To assess the question of democratic consolidation in Croatia and the potential 
influence of EU enlargement policy and political conditionality approach during the past 
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decade, this study relies on archival materials and systematically examines information 
provided by various sources, such as governmental and non-governmental organizations 
and the mass media. Therefore, the study will make use of documents, official reports 
and records deriving from Croatian state institutions. These institutions, such as the 
Government and the Parliament, are the source of a great deal of authentic statistical and 
textual information. However, there is a question of credibility whether the documentary 
source is biased, and thus, as Bryman notices, “caution is necessary in attempting to treat 
(these documents) as depictions of reality.”57  
Having in mind that a government‟s reports can be biased, these will be balanced 
with a range of reports provided by other international organizations, such as: the EU, the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) as well as non-governmental organizations, such as: Transparency International 
(TI), Freedom House, and Reporters without Borders. In addition, in order to balance 
international sources, information provided by domestic non-governmental organizations, 
such as Croatian Helsinki Committee (Hrvatski Helsinški Odbor – HHO) and Croatian 
Journalists‟ Association (Hrvatsko novinarsko društvo – HND) will be included as well. 
These organizations are acknowledged international and domestic actors often cited in 
other publications and thus, can be considered as balanced and reliable sources. In 
addition, these organizations publish annual reports, statements and press releases, which 
can be of great use.  
The data collection over a longer period of time will allow me to observe long-
term developments and trends within the democratic parameters set by the EU and other 
international and domestic actors as well as to consider whether and what changes have 
been made in particular areas of society. Thus, according to previously defined areas of 
research, particular consideration will be paid to reports in the fields of cooperation with 
the ICTY, the fight against corruption, the consolidation of an independent judiciary, and 
fundamental rights, with special attention to freedom of expression. The EU, the OSCE 
and Freedom House provide reports for a wide range of questions covered in this study. 
In addition, Freedom House does not rate countries based on governments‟ intentions or 
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legislation, but based on the practical impact of governmental and non-governmental 
actors on individual rights and freedoms. However, there is a possibility that information 
provided by Freedom House may be oversimplified. As Ramet and Wagner argue, “an 
endeavor to reduce a complex phenomenon to a numerical value inevitable involves some 
oversimplification.”58 Thus, data from that source will be used cautiously and not as 
absolute indicators. In addition, more specific information is provided by Transparency 
international, which rates countries in terms of corruption and the rule of law, and offers 
annual reports on corruption based on the perceptions of business people, academics and 
risk analysts. Thus, it can be viewed as an independent and valuable measurement tool in 
the areas of corruption and rule of law. In addition, Reporters without Borders reports 
also present a valuable tool because they include in their reports every kind of violation 
directly affecting journalists, such as murders, physical attacks and threats, as well as 
news media, such as censorship. Moreover, these reports focus particularly on freedom of 
the media, without entering into issues of quality. 
Having this in mind, the reports from the aforementioned actors and in these 
particular fields are considered to be adequate sources to assess the question of 
democratic consolidation in Croatia regarding the issues covered in this study. However, 
there is an issue of credibility and representativeness, since “people who write documents 
are likely to have a particular point of view they want to get across.”59 Therefore, these 
will be examined in the context of other sources of data as well. Thus, additional sources 
are academic books and scientific articles related to democratic consolidation, EU 
enlargement policies and political conditionality, human rights issues, the rule of law, the 
ICTY, and the fight against corruption and organized crime. At the same time, a wide 
range of newspapers articles and interviews that observed political and social events in 
Croatia during the past decade will be consulted as well. 
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3. Tudjman era (1990-1999) and the issue of Tudjman’s legacy 
 
In this section, I will present a brief overview of modern Croatian history beginning with 
the election of president Franjo Tudjman in 1990. I will examine how Tudjman‟s 
personality and style of governance influenced his decisions as well as the common 
consequences of Tudjman‟s legacy for post-Tudjman‟s Croatia. Moreover, Tudjman‟s 
legacy is often perceived as one of the reasons why Croatia has required a longer period 
of democratic consolidation and lagged behind in relation to European integration 
structures.
60
 Thus, having in mind a specific time in which his decisions occurred, I will 
closely address Tudjman‟s personality and style of governance in relation to European 
integration structures, in these particular areas: the cooperation with the ICTY, the fight 
against corruption, the consolidation of an independent judiciary, and fundamental rights, 
with special attention to freedom of expression. 
 
3.1. Tudjman’s personality and style of governance 
Dr. Franjo Tudjman (1922-1999) and his party HDZ, which acted as a national 
movement for Croatia‟s independence, entered the Croatian political scene in 1989. In the 
first multiparty elections in May 1990, the HDZ won with 41.9 per cent of votes and 
Tudjman became the first Croatian president.
61
 He was a charismatic leader who 
perceived himself as the father of the nation („otac nacije’), supreme commander of the 
armed forces („vrhovni poglavar oružanih snaga’) and head of state („državni poglavar’ 
instead of ‘predsjednik’). With his party, Tudjman dominated political scene and ruled 
the country uninterruptedly in the first decade of Croatia‟s recent history, from 1990 to 
1999.
62
 Therefore, as Sadkovich notes, the image of Croatia was for the most part based 
on the image of its president, and both were mostly portrayed in a negative way. Hence, a 
common Western perception of Tudjman was the one of an anti-Semitic and anti-Serbian 
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Croatian nationalist whose intention was to dismantle Yugoslavia and create a Greater 
Croatia.
63
 However, in his letter to the US Congress, Tudjman denied these claims and 
condemned the genocide against the Jews, Gypsies, Croats, Serbs and other groups 
committed by the Nazis and their collaborators in Croatia during the Second World 
War.
64
 At the same time, in his letter to the „Times Literary Supplementa‟, prominent 
Croatian intellectual Slavko Goldstein pointed out that Tudjman was neither anti-Semitic, 
nor a fascist or war-monger.
65
 On the other hand, Tudjman‟s public appearance and his 
military austerity have also contributed to a widespread perception of Tudjman as an 
authoritarian ruler intolerant toward different opinions. Yet, some of his close associates 
have observed after Tudjman‟s death, that he was often willing to listen to other people 
opinions‟ before making a final decision, especially in military issues.66 
In terms of international politics, Tudjman perceived governments as vehicles of 
which the main goal was to promote the national interests of their peoples. He favored 
diplomacy over military action and, during the war in Croatia, he was constantly 
accepting peace proposals, even at times when these were not to Croatia‟s advantage.67 
As Tomac jokingly comments, Tudjman should have been forbidden to carry a pen when 
going to the negotiations, because he had an irresistible desire to immediately sign any 
agreement or an ultimatum as soon as someone had put it on the table.
68
 In contrast, he 
would resist any kind of compromise on things he considered to be matters of principle, 
and legacy of the War of Independence was one of these things. 
At the same time, Ramet and Søberg argue that Tudjman‟s style of governance 
was paternal and it was principally based on his self-concept of the father of the 
country.
69
 During the 1990‟s Croatia had a semi-presidential system and Tudjman was 
using his constitutional powers, which allowed him to set up agencies and pass decrees 
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with the force of law. Ramet and Wagner argue that Tudjman has established so-called 
„democradura system‟, democratic in from but authoritarian in nature where, in order to 
neutralize liberal groups within the HDZ and opposition parties, he abused state powers.
70
 
Thus, although the political system was nominally based on liberal-democratic principles 
with a political pluralism, a market economy and respect for human rights, in reality the 
system was limited by the dominance of one political party, the ruling HDZ and its 
leader, Franjo Tudjman, who had complete control over the party and the government. At 
the same time, the so-called „Zagreb crisis’ deeply damaged Tudjman‟s public image and 
largely contributed to those voices that perceived him as an authoritarian ruler. In the 
1995 Zagreb elections, the united opposition of seven parties obtained 65 per cent of 
seats in the City Council and thus, appointed their candidate for Zagreb‟s mayor. 
However, since the ruling HDZ individually attained more votes than any other single 
party, Tudjman refused to confirm an elected major and insisted on his own candidate. As 
Ĉular argues, although this decision was founded on the law, it was highly questionable 
and it demonstrated that a crucial element of a consolidated democracy, which is 
acceptance of the electoral results, was missing.
71
 
However, in order to understand Tudjman‟s style of governance, it is necessary to 
keep in mind the specificity of his time. In Croatia, transformation from a totalitarian into 
a democratic system has occurred under specific circumstances of a five-year long war of 
independence, where the country‟s statehood was in direct danger. In order to annex part 
of Croatian territory, Serbia under the leadership of Slobodan Milošević mobilized the 
local Serb community in Croatia and Yugoslav Peoples‟ Army. The majority of the Serb 
community in Croatia as well as the Serbs‟ main political leaders refused to accept the 
new Croatian government and refused to recognize Croatia as a sovereign and an 
independent state. Moreover, the Serbian Democratic Party (Srpska demokratska stranka 
– SDS) openly opposed the constitution of the state, refused to participate in the 
Parliament and engaged in a violent ethnic rebellion.
72
 In addition, although Croatia was 
an internationally recognized country, one third of its territory was occupied and, until 
the summer 1995, the government was not able to exercise its power throughout the 
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country. As Ramet and Søberg argue, it is expected that during the war and severe crisis a 
government establishes a certain control over economy, industry and media, since a 
society cannot function as it would do in regular times. However, the problem is that such 
a style governance often persists after the war or crisis has ended, creating a prolonged 
period of illiberal practices.
73
 In Croatia, the same style of governance persisted not only 
after summer 1995, but also after 1998 peaceful reintegration of the Danube region and 
completion of the Croatian state-building project. 
However, despite his paternal style of governance, Tudjman remained the most 
popular politician in Croatia during the 1990‟s. In both the 1992 and 1997 presidential 
elections, Tudjman won in the first round, with 56.73 per cent and 61.41 per cent of votes 
respectively.
74
 At the same time, Tudjman‟s popularity, unlike the popularity of the 
ruling HDZ, remained high even after his death in December 1999.
75
 In the following 
part, having in mind a specific time in which Tudjman‟s decisions occurred, I will closely 
address Tudjman‟s style of governance in relation to European integration structures and 
the following areas: the cooperation with the ICTY, the fight against corruption, the 
consolidation of an independent judiciary, and fundamental rights, with special attention 
to freedom of expression. 
 
3.2. Tudjman’s approach toward European integration issues 
In May 1990, Tudjman clearly stated in his speech in the Croatian Parliament that the 
government, simultaneously with an internal democratic transformation of the country, 
had to take all necessary steps in order to include Croatia in the European Community.
76
 
Moreover, Tudjman often stressed Croatia‟s Habsburg heritage, Christian roots as well as 
culture, and believed that Croatia was a Central European, an Adriatic and a 
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Mediterranean country. In Tudjman‟s view, Croatia was never a Balkan state, nor did it 
ever belong to the Orthodox or Islamic world as such. However, as Sadkovich explains, 
the attitudes based on history and nationalism were rather unwelcome in the international 
community, especially during the 1990‟s, when the majority of the international actors 
focused on the regional and global integration of states. In that sense, “globalization and 
the free market were the catchwords, not self-determination and autarky. 
Multiculturalism was the vogue, not nationalism. Integration was the trend, not 
secession.”77 
Although Tudjman has repeatedly stressed the importance of Croatian 
membership in the EU, he was ironically at the same time often portrayed as the main 
obstacle on Croatia‟s way toward European integration. During Tudjman‟s term in office 
Croatia was slowly integrating into different international organizations and became a 
member of the OSCE, the Council of Europe (CoE) and the Quadrilateral (Croatia, 
Slovenia, Italy and Hungary). In addition, the EU‟s PHARE program (Programme of 
Community aid to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe) was extended to Croatia 
as well. However, Croatia was excluded from the PHARE program and the accession into 
the EU‟s structures was stopped in the summer 1995. In the following years, the EU 
presented several regional programs in order to achieve permanent peace and stability in 
the Southeast Europe, as well as to stimulate countries‟ development and prepare them to 
join the Euro-Atlantic integrations. In May 1999, the EU presented its idea to initiate the 
Stabilization and Association Process (SAP). The program has put greater emphasis on a 
regional cooperation between the five Southeast European countries, including Croatia.
78
 
In order to further strengthen regional cooperation, the Stability Pact for South Eastern 
Europe (SP) was launched in October 1999.  
The SAP and SP programs and the regional cooperation as such were highly 
problematic and unpopular in Croatia. The Croatian leadership as well as many Croats 
believed that, due to country‟s heritage, democratic and economic standards, Croatia‟s 
place is within Central Europe and not with Balkan countries. The additional problem 
was the fear among many Croats that the SAP and SP intend to push Croatia into the new 
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regional structures based on the so-called „ex Yugoslavia minus Slovenia plus Albania‟ 
political formula, which reminded Croats of socialist Yugoslavia. 
 
3.3. The war crimes and cooperation with the ICTY  
On 22 February 1993, UN Resolution 808 called for an international tribunal which 
would prosecute persons accused of war crimes and violations of humanitarian law in the 
former Yugoslavia since 1991. Initially, Tudjman supported the establishment of the 
ICTY, believing it would condemn Serbia‟s aggression against Croatia and bring Serbian 
war criminals to justice. On 19 April 1996, the Parliament approved the Constitutional 
Law for Cooperation of the Republic of Croatia with the ICTY, recognizing the court‟s 
jurisdiction over crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia since 1991.
79
 Shortly after, 
it became clear that the ICTY would also bring charges against Croatian military 
personnel. Six Bosnian Croats, who were accused of committing war crimes in Bosnia 
during the Croat-Muslim conflict, were handed in to the ICTY in 1996. Although 
Tudjman was reluctant to comply with the ICTY demands, international pressure and 
especially the temporary suspension of Croatia‟s admission in the CoE extracted certain 
results. Moreover, Tudjman was in general willing to cooperate with the ICTY in regard 
to the Croat-Muslim conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, this was not the case 
in 1997, when the ICTY asked for documents related to two other military operations led 
by Croatian military forces on Croatian territory: Operation Medak Pocket (Medački 
džep) in 1993 and Operation Storm (Oluja) in 1995. 
Operation Strom was conducted in August 1995. It was a military and a police 
operation intended to regain occupied Croatian territory and restore Croatia‟s control 
within its internationally recognized borders. At the same time, the operation also 
signaled a defeat of the Great-Serbian project of creating a homogenous Serbian state on 
Croatian and Bosnian territory. In response to the Croatian action, the leadership of the 
so-called „Krajina‟ region evacuated a large number of civilians about 150,000 people. 
However, one part of the population also left because of the fear of revenge and only a 
smaller number of 5,000-6,000 mainly elderly Serbs stayed in their houses. Besides, in 
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the months after Operation Storm, more than 600 people were killed and a large number 
of houses were either robbed or burned. In the following years, it was repeatedly argued 
that Tudjman‟s politics contributed to the mass departure of the Serb population as well.80 
At the same time, according to Hodge, the so-called „equivalence of guilt‟ approach, 
silently introduced by the international community, came into full play right after 
Operation Storm. In Hodge‟s view, the Croatian successful retaking of the Serb-occupied 
territory did not fit the international, and more particularly the British vision of the 
region, in which Croatia was destined to have a subsidiary role.
81
  
Therefore, the lack of cooperation with the ICTY was one of the main reasons to 
exclude Croatia from different organizations and aid packages that were offered to other 
post-communist countries in Europe. However, Tudjman claimed that Croatia had not 
accomplished the desired progress in relation to European integration because of 
ungrounded accusations that the country had not fulfilled certain necessary international 
commitments. In addition, he claimed that the purpose of different international pressures 
was to change the political situation in Croatia.
82
 For Tudjman, the war of independence 
and its legacy was a matter of principle, and he would resist any kind of compromise in 
regard to it. In 1998, with the peaceful reintegration of Danube region, Croatia succeeded 
in taking control over the entire national territory. Moreover, Tudjman played an 
important role in this process. According to his close associate Vesna Škare Oţbolt, 
Tudjman was also concerned about the Serb population in Danube region. He was aware 
that the mass departure of the Serb population after Operation Storm caused enormous 
international damage to Croatia, and he did not want something similar to happen in 
Eastern Slavonia.
83
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At the same time, on 5 March 1999, Croatian parliament passed the resolution in which it 
declared that Operations Flash (Bljesak) and Storm (Oluja) are solely under the 
jurisdiction of the Croatian judiciary. Some scholars argue that Tudjman‟s failure to 
prosecute war crimes right after they had been committed led to subsequent problems 
with the ICTY and thus, kept Croatia out of the EU‟s accession process in the 1990‟s.84 
In addition, one of the main problems in cooperation with the ICTY was that the 
requirements posed by the Hague Tribunal on Croatian government touched upon 
directly on Croatian national identity and statehood, and thus provoked strong resistance 
from state authorities as well as Croatian citizens. 
 
3.4. The issue of corruption and privatization deals 
According to the EBRD report on 22 transition countries in 1999, the level of corruption 
in Croatia during the 1990‟s was about average for transition countries and was mostly 
including payment of bribes to public officials in order to avoid paying taxes or to obtain 
exemptions from different regulations and gain privileged information and loan terms.
85
 
At the same time, the early years of independence brought an enormous amount of power 
for the new political elite and this has opened many opportunities for corruption, 
especially through various privatization deals. In Croatia, the privatization process was 
mostly centered in the hands of a small group of people, so-called „tycoons‟86, who were 
close to Tudjman and the ruling party. Besides them, a number of high-ranking HDZ 
politicians, including Tudjman‟s close family have also benefited from the privatization 
process. Thus, Ramet and Søberg argue that corruption, cronyism and nepotism went 
hand in hand with Tudjman‟s years in office.87 In addition, the widespread opinion was 
that Tudjman himself supported the creation of a new business class consisting of some 
200 rich families. On the other hand, Tudjman has claimed that approximately two 
million citizens, mostly workers and war victims, had taken part in the privatization 
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process, while more than 300,000 Croats had bought apartments on a discount.
88
 At the 
same time, according to Grubiša, a wide parliamentary debate on corruption and 
organized crime in 1994, was a certain improvement in democratic society, although 
there was no real political action against these malformations.
89
 
There are several reasons why the political process became corrupted in the early 
years of independence. In Ramet‟s view, one of the reasons was Tudjman‟s self-concept 
of the father of his country. In that sense, Tudjman believed that he knew the best what is 
in Croatia‟s and Croats‟ interest.90 As mentioned, Tudjman‟s style of governance was 
paternal and he largely controlled both the government and the ruling HDZ. Perhaps 
Tudjman was open to hear other opinions, as his close associates claim, but the final 
decision was always his. In addition, the entire decade was predominantly marked by one 
particular party and its leader, which was another reason for expanding corruption. As 
Dolenc argues, Croatia has not experienced any alternations in power during the 1990‟s, 
which is the crucial mechanism against state exploitation.
91
 At the same time, the war of 
independence and occupation of a quarter of Croatia‟s territory badly damaged the 
country‟s economy, braked its transport and communication system, resulted in the loss 
of markets and displaced hundreds of thousands of people. This created a black market 
and at the same time, many opportunities for criminal acts and corruption. Therefore, 
Sadkovich argues that attributing Croatia‟s economic inequalities and corruption 
problems only to Tudjman and the ruling HDZ, and neglecting other aspects as well, 
presents a naïve explanation of a complex transition period.
92
 
After the war of independence, Croatia‟s economy experienced a significant 
economic growth and a relatively low inflation. The average annual GDP growth was 
around 6.00 per cent, while the inflation was around 3.00 per cent. However, in 1998, the 
country entered a phase of a deep recession and the rate of GDP growth dropped to 2.3 
per cent. Although the government succeeded in stabilizing the currency and keeping the 
inflation low, the rate of GDP growth further dropped and amounted -0.5 per cent in 
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1999. In addition, the high levels of unemployment and low living standard of Croatian 
citizens only worsened the overall appalling country‟s economy. In 1998, the 
unemployment level was 14.5 per cent, which further increased to 17.2 per cent in 1999. 
At the same time, the state‟s external debt was rising as well, and in 1998 reached 5,382 
millions US dollars, which was 37.5 per cent of the country‟s GDP.93 
Because of the difficult economic situation in the country, the public was 
increasingly criticizing the badly handled privatization process as well as the emergence 
of the „nouveau riche‟ among people loyal to the ruling party. The beneficiaries of 
government‟s privatization policies not only contributed to the economic depression but 
seriously damaged the HDZ‟s popularity. At the same time, Tudjman himself openly 
talked about these „negative manifestations‟ (‘negativne pojavnosti’) in the society, 
especially about the economic crime and corruption, but also about the abuse of power of 
some officials, bribery and inefficient judiciary. These were detected as main 
abnormalities in the society, and therefore, in his opinion, Croatian citizens‟ 
dissatisfaction was more than justified.
94
  
 
3.5. Problems in the judiciary 
During the 1990‟s, several problems emerged in Croatian judicial system. One of the 
problems was the extension of corruption to this sector, which has remained a huge 
problem until today. According to Transparency International, the judiciary is perceived 
as the most corrupted sector in Croatia in the past years, with the corruption perception 
index reaching 4.1 in 2010.
95
 Another problem is related to a wide-spread change of staff 
in judiciary in the early 1990‟s and, especially after 1995. Many Serbs as well as Croats 
were dismissed from their duties, mostly due to lack of loyalty to the ruling party, and 
were replaced with the politically more suitable, but at the same time less educated and 
less professional judicial staff. According to Freedom House, 13 Supreme Court justices 
and 400 judges were dismissed on political grounds.
96
 In addition, the State Judiciary 
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Council (Državno sudbeno vijeće – DSV), a main body in charge of recruitment of 
representatives of the legislative sector and appointment of court presidents was formed 
in 1996. The DSV was largely controlled by the HDZ and it became a ruling party‟s tool 
in appointing judicial staff close to party in power. This practice has had a strong impact 
on the independence, accountability, impartiality and professionalism of the judicial 
branch in Croatia. Having this in mind, a large number of unresolved civil cases, of 
which some were inherited from previous political system, as well as the length of court 
proceedings only contributed to general inefficiency of the legal system in Croatia in the 
1990‟s. 
At the same time, in the early 1990‟s war crime prosecutions against the JNA and 
para-military Serb forces were often happening ‘in absentia’. Moreover, the prosecutions 
have lacked clear and precise claims based on individual responsibility, and the majority 
of them have not been managed in a professional way. At the same time, according to 
different international organizations and domestic human rights observers, such as 
Croatian Helsinki Committee, there was a lack of political will to address different 
atrocities and conduct war crimes prosecutions against Croatian military personnel for 
crimes against the members of Serb population, especially after 1995. Already in 1998, 
the state authorities rejected these claims, stating that there were several criminal 
prosecutions in regard to murders, robberies, severe injuries and kidnappings. However, 
only one case of war crimes against prisoners of war was registered. In addition, 
according to official statistics, the county courts in Karlovac, Sisak, Zadar and Šibenik 
have addressed 2670 cases related to criminal acts committed in the areas of Operation 
Storm up to now.
97
  
At the same time, there were a number of positive developments in the judicial 
field, particularly in terms of legal acts and amnesty cases. In 1996, according to the Law 
on General Amnesty, all perpetrators of criminal acts committed during the aggression 
and armed rebellion in Croatia, except those who committed war crimes, were granted 
immunity from criminal prosecution. In addition, the 1997 Law on Convalidation opened 
the possibility for the validation of judicial and administrative documents issued in the 
previously occupied Croatian territory, the so-called „Krajina region‟.  
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However, wide-ranging malformations in judiciary in the 1990‟s directly undermined the 
efficiency of the court system and threatened the legal security of Croatian citizens. The 
judiciary was, at this point, largely under political influence and was not functioning as 
an independent and impartial state branch. In addition, the state authorities were neither 
willing nor capable of carrying out necessary structural reforms in the judicial branch and 
promoting as well as strengthening the rule of law. Therefore, the Freedom House rate on 
Croatia‟s judicial framework and independence in 1999 was 4.75 per cent, which 
signifies a partly free judiciary.
98
 
 
3.6. Fundamental rights and freedom of expression in the 1990’s 
As mentioned earlier, Tudjman was mostly perceived as an anti-Semitic and anti-Serbian 
Croatian nationalist, and these epithets were often applied to Croatia as well, especially in 
the early 1990‟s. The first Croatian Constitution, known as the „Christmas Constitution‟ 
(‘Božićni ustav’) in 1990, equated national minorities in Croatia, including Serbs, in their 
rights with Croats, guaranteeing a range of cultural and other rights. Many scholars argue 
that inclusion of eight national minorities already in the Constitutional Preamble in the 
early 1990‟s represents a unique example and a high ideal of constitutional practice.99 In 
addition, many of Tudjman‟s close associates claim that he was never opposing Serbs as 
a nation, but he strongly opposed the Great-Serbian idea of creating a homogenous 
Serbian state on Croatian territory. Furthermore, Tudjman‟s close associates, including 
prime ministers and ministers, claim that Tudjman was ready to guarantee minority rights 
for Serbs and to include them in the executive branch.
100
  
At the same time, the national minorities had their representatives in the Croatian 
Parliament in both the 1992 and 1995 elections.
101
 At first, Serbs were entitled to 
proportional representation in the Parliament, while other minority groups could count on 
four seats. However, the proportional representation was abandoned in 1995, when 
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Croatian armed forces retook the so-called „Krajina region‟. Since then, Croatia was 
under constant international pressure to pass a new Law on National Minorities, but this 
did not happen until 2002.  
Moreover, during the 1991-1995 conflicts the number of internally displaced 
persons and refuges exceeded 500,000 people. Thus, the two-way return of refugees and 
displaced persons and the protection of national minorities were important tasks for the 
Croatian leadership in the second half of the 1990‟s. At the same time, these actions were 
closely observed by the OSCE and other international organizations. According to the 
OSCE, merely 80,000 Croatian Serb refugees had registered their return to Croatia 
between 1995 and 2001. The annual refugee return reached its peak in 1999, when 
18,000 refugees returned to their homes.
102
 However, although the government has made 
some positive steps in terms of refugee return, some of the problems, such as 
repossession of private property as well as loss of tenancy rights remained.  
After 1995, around 19,500 Croatian Serb-owned properties in previously 
occupied areas were distributed to Bosnian Croat refugees from Bosanska Posavina for 
temporary use. Many of them had to wait to resolve their house reconstruction requests in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and faced other barriers for their return as well. However, in the 
period from 1995 to 2001, around 9,500 houses were successfully returned to Croatian 
Serb-owners.
103
 On the other hand, many Serb returnees were facing problems in their 
local communities, where authorities had often obstructed the return process, and there 
had been high level of animosity of the local population, as well as verbal and physical 
attacks on returnees. At that point, many Croats believed that the return of Serb refugees 
would not be a good thing for the country and had strong feelings of animosity toward 
Serb returnees in general. 
At the same time, the transformation from a totalitarian into a democratic system 
also entails the separation of the media from the state, by providing the necessary 
legislative framework as well as creating an atmosphere in which independent media 
could prosper. During the 1990‟s Croatian media scene was divided between so-called 
state building media (‘državotvorni’), such as Croatian Radio Television (HRT), the 
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Croatian News Agency (HINA), Vjesnik, and Večernji list, and independent media, such 
as Globus (1990), Feral Tribune (1993), Nacional (1995), Novi list and Jutarnji list 
(1998). The state-building media were expected to contribute to national cohesion, order 
and unity, while the independent media were trying to promote diversity and the 
liberalization of ideas and political options.  
In 1990‟s, the most important media in Croatia were under state control, and have 
primarily served as a tool for legitimating the HDZ‟s leadership. The HRT was the main 
broadcaster in promoting the government policies, the ruling party and its leader Franjo 
Tudjman. From 1991 to 1995, HRT’s chief executive was Antun Vrdoljak, a well-known 
film director but also a prominent HDZ member. At the same time, HRT’s political show 
„Latinica‟ has been on the air since 1993 and has covered a wide-range of controversial 
topics, such as corruption and war crimes. Though, many episodes were taken off air 
because the editors judged them to be too controversial. In the late 1990‟s, the producer 
and host of the show, Denis Latin left the pubic broadcaster and came back after the 
executive structure changed in 2000.
104
 
In addition, frequent libel suits against the independent media and journalists, 
based both on the civil as well as on the penal code only contributed to the lack of media 
freedom. According to Ramet, many publishers, editors and journalists were involved in 
more than a thousand court proceedings in 1990-1999 period. Globus, Novi list and 
Nacional were responsible for 56 per cent of the „offending articles‟. As of April 1999, 
about 80 court proceedings and appeals were involving Feral Tribune alone.
105
 However, 
as Uzelac argues, some media gave rise to the proceedings because of violation of 
privacy, reputation and dignity, mostly due to political and commercial reasons.
106
 In 
addition, there were several privatization cases of the media, in which ownership was 
transferred to the government‟s allies and people close to the ruling party, as it was in the 
case of Večernji list. In 1996, HDZ officials shut down an independent „Radio 101‟, by 
refusing to renew its broadcasting license. This resulted in a massive protest at the main 
Zagreb‟s square, where around 100,000 people gathered. Having this in mind, there was a 
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persistent criticism from international organizations toward Croatia for restricting media 
freedoms. According to Freedom House rankings, the average independent media index 
in Croatia during the 1990-1999 period was 5.00, which is to say partly free.
107
 
At the same time, the independent media have pushed for further democratization 
and pluralism in the media sector. They have called for freedom of expression, reporting 
and publishing as well as for protection of journalists.
108
 The media have also played an 
important role in raising public awareness of different abnormalities in Croatian society, 
mostly related to the privatization process. They criticized the government and the ruling 
party, and reported on doubtful entrepreneurial activities involving some members of 
Tudjman‟s closest family and the HDZ members with state institutions and companies. In 
1998, one daily newspaper revealed that Tudjman‟s wife had a deposit of 210.000 DM in 
her personal bank account in a Zagreb bank. This case especially damaged Tudjman‟s 
family‟s as well as the ruling party‟s reputation.109 At the same time, Tudjman‟s personal 
relationship with the media was rather bad. Radoš argues that Tudjman‟s distrust of the 
media was rooted in his deep frustration because of the media treatment while he was still 
a dissident in socialist Yugoslavia. In Radoš‟s view, Tudjman simply did not understand 
the meaning of the media in democracy.
110
 
 
3.7. Tudjman era: Summarizing the main features 
The war for independence, as well as Tudjman‟s personality and paternal style of 
governance based on his self-image of the father of the country, have largely influenced 
the Croatian political scene in the 1990‟s. The country‟s specific circumstances have 
removed most of the political and social reform issues from the political agenda and thus, 
have slowed down democratic changes and consolidation in Croatia. At the same time, 
Tudjman‟s as well as the HDZ‟s dominance and style of governance largely contributed 
to the country‟s problems in the judiciary and many other areas.  
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The various privatization deals carried out by people close to the ruling HDZ only 
contributed to corruption, which became widespread and deeply rooted in Croatian 
society in the early years of independence. Thus, in his 1998 Christmas message, 
Croatian archbishop Josip Bozanić explicitly talked about all these abnormalities and 
particularly expressed his concern about the „sin of the ruling elites‟ (‘grijeh struktura’), 
using the phrase to mark the problems of corruption, nepotism and social disruption. 
Although Tudjman succeeded in stabilizing the currency, the rising unemployment and 
low living standard of Croatian citizens played a crucial role in turning the public against 
the HDZ. Therefore, after Tudjman‟s death in December 1999, and parliamentary 
elections in January 2000, the state power shifted to a centre-left coalition led by the SDP 
and Ivica Raĉan.  
Having this in mind, it is possible to argue that, according to Linz‟s and Stepan‟s 
as well as Schedler‟s criteria, Croatia was far away from a consolidated democracy 
during the 1990‟s. In 1998, the country finally succeeded in consolidating its territory, 
but the basic principles of democracy and rule of law were not present. In addition, 
although Tudjman wanted Croatia to join the EU and was ready to make some steps in 
that direction, he mostly resisted to comply with EU requirements, especially in regard to 
cooperation with the ICTY. Thus, the international actors were most of the time rather 
unsuccessful in encouraging necessary reforms in Croatia and the impact of the EU‟s 
enlargement policies and political conditionality on democratic consolidation in the 
country practically did not exist or was rather small. 
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4. Račan’s prime ministership (2000-2003) 
 
In 1999, Croatia was still feeling the consequences of the recent war. In addition, the 
country was deprived by badly managed privatization deals, widespread corruption, 
international isolation and low level of living standard of its citizens. Thus, many 
scholars argue that the ruling HDZ set the stage for its own defeat.
111
 The opposition 
parties exploited the dissatisfaction of the Croatian people and focused primarily on 
economic and social issues. The main campaign slogan of the left oriented Raĉan-Budiša 
coalition (SDP-HSLS) was „It is time for changes‟ (Vrijeme je za promjene). On the other 
hand, the HDZ was not only carrying a heavy burden of the responsibility for a bad 
economic situation in the country, but also unwilling to change its 1990‟s national 
rhetoric. Moreover, the party was seriously shaken by Tudjman‟s death in December 
1999 and the strategy to capitalize on Tudjman‟s popularity was not successful enough to 
win the 2000 elections. 
 
4.1. Democratic turnover in 2000 
On 3 January 2000, the left-oriented Raĉan-Budiša coalition convincingly won the 
elections, and jointly formed the government with other moderate democratic parties. 
Although the HDZ has remained individually the strongest party in the Parliament, the 
left oriented coalition partners had a majority of 96 out of 151 seats and were able to pass 
the necessary decisions without any particular problems. At the same time, the ethnic 
minority representatives groups were allocated five seats in the Parliament.
112
 After the 
2000 elections, Ivica Raĉan (1943-2007) became the new Croatian prime minister. He 
was actively involved in politics for more than 30 years and had attained high positions in 
socialist Yugoslavia. Raĉan‟s communist past was often a heavy burden for his political 
actions in the years afterwards. His claim that the HDZ was a party of dangerous 
intentions (‘stranka opasnih namjera’) was often used against him in many political 
battles. However, Raĉan himself claimed that the sentence was taken out of the context. 
At the same time, he was a very skilled politician but some argue, sometimes too slow in 
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making decisions. However, he was perceived as a realistic and a constructive politician, 
without any affairs attached to his name.
113
  
At the same time, in the 2000 presidential elections, Stjepan Mesić (b.1934) 
became the new Croatian president. Mesić‟s victory came as a surprise, especially since 
the pre-election public opinion polls favored the other two candidates: the SDP-HSLS 
candidate Draţen Budiša and the HDZ candidate Mate Granić, while Mesić was 
perceived as an outsider. However, Mesić‟s presidential campaign based on his anti-
Tudjman posture and criticism of the ex-president‟s decisions, secured him victory in the 
run off against Budiša.114 At the same time, the state media, that were often labeled as 
pro-HDZ provided mostly balanced coverage of the presidential campaign.  
Many scholars argue that the change of government in the 2000 elections was 
influenced mostly by economic dissatisfaction on the part of Croatian citizens, and less 
by the pressure from the EU. Additionally, the 2000 elections also signify a moment 
when Croatia was able to start to consolidate its democracy. The space for democratic 
consolidation was wide open and the new political elite gained an opportunity to accept 
and adapt to the basic rules of democratic game as well as to secure political and social 
consensus on strengthening democracy.
115
 One of the issues Raĉan‟s government had to 
deal with, was the issue of Tudjman‟s legacy. After Tudjman‟s death, the political system 
in Croatia changed from a semi-presidential to a parliamentary one, with narrow political 
powers for the president and a strengthened role for the Parliament. In addition, Raĉan‟s 
government‟s goals were to depoliticize the army and police forces, introduce civilian 
control over the secret service, revise the 1990‟s privatization deals and combat 
corruption.
116
 The new government also had to revitalize country‟s economy and take 
Croatia out of international isolation. 
The international community welcomed the positive changes in Croatia after 
Tudjman‟s death. The country became a member of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), entered NATO‟s Partnership for Peace program (PfP) and started to build closer 
relations with the EU. In November 2000, at Zagreb Summit, the EU launched the 
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Stabilization and Association Program (SAP) for five Southeast European countries, 
including Croatia. The Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) was signed in 
October 2001 and entered into ratification procedure in all EU member states 
parliaments. Furthermore, in February 2003, the country submitted its official application 
to join the EU. Thus, the steps taken in the early 2000‟s clearly show that Croatia-EU 
relations had become a priority issue for both sides. 
At first, there was a widespread belief that Croatia would catch up with other 
Central European countries on their way to the EU. This expectation was based on 
several reasons, such as: positive democratic changes after 2000 elections, the country‟s 
economy that was more advanced in comparison with other Southeast European 
countries, and the relevant political parties‟ consensus on the importance of the EU 
membership. However, this expectation shortly after proved to be ungrounded, due to 
lack of cooperation with the ICTY and prejudice of some EU member states, mostly the 
UK, against Croatia. Although Croatian citizens were generally preoccupied with 
economic problems, they were quite disappointed when Croatia missed the opportunity to 
join the EU accession negotiations with other Central European countries and was 
grouped with Balkan states in the SAP.
117
 Therefore, Raĉan‟s government strategy was to 
comply with the EU requirements but, at the same time, to present Croatia as the most 
successful among the SAP countries. Additionally, his government insisted on individual 
evaluation of each country‟s achievements, so that Croatia would not be laid back by 
other economically less developed and democratically less advanced SAP countries. 
 
4.2. The war crimes and cooperation with the ICTY 
Shortly after the elections, the new government reaffirmed its obligation to cooperate 
with the Hague Tribunal. In April 2000, the Parliament adopted new Declaration on 
Cooperation with the ICTY, unconditionally accepting the ICTY‟s authority for war 
crimes committed during the 1991-1995 period. At this point, the military operations 
Flash and Storm were no longer under exclusive jurisdiction of Croatian judiciary.
118
 In 
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addition, in 2000 general Tihomir Blaškić (b.1960), a Bosnian Croat, was sentenced by 
the ICTY to 45 years in prison for war crimes committed during the Croat-Muslim 
conflict in Bosnia.
119
  
Developments at that time mobilized both veteran‟s movements and opposition 
parties, mainly the HDZ, which accused the state authorities of criminalization of 
Croatia‟s struggle for independence. In September 2000, 12 army generals openly warned 
against „widespread criminalization of the Homeland war‟ by signing a public letter. 
They warned against the unnecessary use of police force, proclamation of guilt even 
before an official investigation and court verdict took place, and „bidding‟ on the ICTY‟s 
indictments. They agreed on prosecution of every war crime committed during the War 
of Independence, in accordance with democratic standards and procedures.
120
 Although 
some politicians, including Raĉan‟s coalition partners, called the letter a script for 
reconciliation, the majority considered it an inappropriate way for the active military 
personnel to communicate with the state authorities. Some even labeled this act a 
rebellion of the military personnel. Thus, Mesić promptly dismissed 7 generals and 
signatories of the letter from the active service „because of interference in state 
politics‟.121 In the heat of these events, in October 2000, Raĉan‟s government issued a 
new Declaration on the Homeland war, stressing out that the war of independence was a 
legitimate, defensive and liberating war, with the main goal to defend Croatian territory 
against Great-Serbian aggression. The Declaration also called for a principle of individual 
accountability of guilt when dealing with cases of war crimes.
122
 
In February 2001, the ICTY set out a new indictment, against Miro Norac 
(b.1967), a Croatian army general accused of committing war crimes against Serbs in 
Gospić and Operation Medak Pocket (Medački džep), in September 1993. The veteran‟s 
movements and opposition parties once again organized a number of protests throughout 
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the country. The mass demonstration in Split gathered between 100,000 and 150,000 
people under the slogan „We are all Mirko Norac‟ (‘Svi smo mi Mirko Norac’), implying 
that accusations against the Croatian general were accusations against the War of 
Independence, Croatia and all Croats. The organizers of the Split protest called for the 
resignations of Raĉan and Mesić, labeling them communists and traitors, and called for 
new elections.
123
 In the years afterwards, Raĉan openly spoke out about these events and 
said that there had been a widespread fear among coalition partners that the country 
would collapse in crisis and would not manage to get out of it in a democratic way.
124
 
In addition, in July 2001, two new indictments were directed against generals 
Ante Gotovina
125
 indicted for war crimes committed during Operation Storm, and Rahim 
Ademi
126
 indicted for war crimes committed in Operation Medak Pocket. While Ademi 
decided to go to the Hague voluntarily, Gotovina went into hiding. At this point, the 
indictment against Gotovina, which included the allegation about „joint criminal 
enterprise‟, became especially problematic for Croatian government.127 Although Raĉan 
protested and demanded withdrawal of controversial parts of the indictment, in the years 
afterwards he acknowledged he did not actually believe in the success of these actions. 
The main reason Raĉan got involved in this type of criticism was the pressure from the 
opposition parties and large-scale protests across the country.
128
  
On the one hand, Raĉan was willing to fully cooperate with the ICTY and 
introduce necessary reforms, but on the other hand, because of his communist past, he 
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was often forced to prove his patriotism by strengthening the image of a „patriot Croat‟ 
who defends the state interests by all means. 
The ICTY as well as Raĉan‟s approach in dealing with the new indictments had a 
great impact on Croatian domestic politics. In March 2002, due to disagreement with the 
government‟s soft approach toward the ICTY, Budiša and the HSLS withdrew from the 
coalition and the HSLS cabinet ministers resigned.
129
 At this point, Raĉan‟s approach of 
balancing international demands and domestic costs was not very efficient. It was 
affecting the unity of the ruling coalition, strengthening the right-wing opposition parties 
and increasing tensions in the public. This was once again proved in September 2002, 
when former Croatian army general Janko Bobetko was indicted for war crimes 
committed in Operation Medak Pocket, of which he was in charge.
130
 The veteran‟s 
movements and right-wing parties strongly opposed to his transfer to Hague‟s custody 
and Bobetko himself refused to go to the Hague voluntarily. Moreover, at the time of the 
indictment, Bobetko was 83 years old and in poor health. Thus, Raĉan‟s government 
refused to transfer him to Hague‟s custody and announced that the Croatian 
Constitutional court would examine the constitutionality of the indictment. In the early 
2003, the ICTY announced that Bobetko was medically unfit to stand a trial and shortly 
after he died. At this point, Gotovina became the highest ranking Croatian commander 
hunted by the ICTY.  
The „Bobetko affair‟ and lack of cooperation with the ICTY had seriously 
threatened Croatia‟s s path toward the EU. At this point, British and Danish parliaments 
suspended the ratification of the SAA. The UK especially took a strong stance against 
Croatia and became a main blocking agent of the country‟s opening of accession talks. 
Many authors argue that the „Bobetko case‟ revealed all the weaknesses of Raĉan‟s 
administration, in terms of reluctance and lack of capability to fully carry out necessary 
reforms and pull Croatia out of Tudjman‟s era and closer to the EU. In that sense, 
Raĉan‟s government was most of the time intimidated by the right-wing protests, which 
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were often used as an excuse in order to avoid difficult decisions.
131
 Cooperation with the 
ICTY was extremely problematic for the government and every new indictment had 
seriously threatened Raĉan‟s political survival. Thus, the government was most of the 
time unwilling to comply with EU requirements and take out necessary reforms. In 
addition, Pavlaković argues that the government pursued a policy of denial and secrecy 
instead of immediately announcing the arrival of new indictments and preparing Croatian 
public for it, which would be far better and more transparent approach, especially since 
Croatia was the first country among the Yugoslav successor states that started a real 
campaign against war criminals and was ready to deal with its recent past.
132
 In addition, 
this type of approach would have narrowed a space for speculations on the indictments 
and would demonstrate Croatia‟s willingness to comply with international commitments. 
 
4.3. The fight against corruption 
Another problem that Raĉan‟s government had to deal with was corruption. In order to 
combat corruption and organized crime, the government established a solid legal 
framework. In May 2001, the State Audit Act of Transformation and Privatization, 
designed to focus particularly on 1990‟s privatization deals, was adopted. In October 
2001, the government established an independent office specialized to fight corruption: 
The Bureau for Combating of Corruption and Organized Crime (Ured za suzbijanje 
korupcije i organiziranog kriminala – USKOK). In addition, in March 2002, the 
government launched the National Anti-Corruption Program and Action Plan, which 
included a proposal for toll-free telephone lines for citizens who wished to report specific 
cases of corruption. In accordance with the EU‟s requirements, the government has also 
increased international cooperation in these fields. 
At the same time, the symbol of 1990‟s fraudulent privatization, Miroslav Kutle, 
was arrested in February 2000 and charged with criminal offences in business 
transactions related to the Tisak enterprise, causing financial damage of more than 48 
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million HRK. However, due to lack of evidence Kutle was soon released,
133
 which was 
almost the standard procedure with other „tycoons‟ as well. Hence, even when they were 
arrested, proceedings against them have progressed very slowly and usually ended in 
dismissing all charges. At this point, the state system was rather powerless in fighting 
economic crime and other criminal activities from the early 1990‟s.134 Moreover, Raĉan‟s 
government was also facing accusations regarding privatization deals carried out after 
2000. The well-known case was the privatization of „Sunĉani Hvar‟ enterprise, related to 
the vice-president of the government Slavko Linić. The government‟s decision to sell 
Sunĉani Hvar to the Slovenian company Terme Ĉateţ was later withdrawn and the 
danger of losing 17.6 million euros was avoided. The vice-president was involved in 
other controversial cases as well, such as the Viktor Lenac shipyard, the Croatian Post-
Bank and the „Rijeĉa banka‟, where he allegedly assured financial recovery of these 
enterprises and banks under doubtful conditions.
135
 Therefore, Raĉan‟s government was 
under pressure not only of revision of fraudulent privatization deals from the 1990‟s, but 
also by controversial privatization deals which occurred during Raĉan‟s term in office. 
In addition, one of the main pre-election promises of coalition parties, the revision 
of 1990‟s privatization deals was completed in 2004. The State Audit Office processed 
1,556 enterprises and concluded that 15.49 per cent of companies achieved necessary 
privatization goals, 20.5 per cent did it partially, and 64.01 per cent did not achieve these 
goals. Moreover, during the privatization process, these enterprises had 635,373 
employees or 408 on average, and in a time of revision they had 248,698 employees or 
160 on average, which is 386,675 or 60.86 per cent less than previously.
136
 It is important 
to keep in mind the circumstances in which the privatization process was carried out. In 
1991, when the process began, some enterprises were located in the occupied or war-torn 
area; thus the privatization of these enterprises was carried out later on. At the same time, 
a great amount of property was completely or partly destroyed, and enterprises were not 
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operating or were operating under difficult conditions. However, a much bigger problem 
was the termination of business cooperation with other Yugoslav successor states and the 
loss of markets. According to the State Audit Office report, 5.46 per cent of enterprises 
were located in occupied territory and 20.65 per cent in the war-torn area. In addition, 
15.23 per cent enterprises reported war damage, while 36.76 per cent experienced the 
termination of business cooperation with their partners in the region and loss of 
markets.
137
 Therefore, the 1990‟s privatization process was carried out under difficult 
conditions of war and occupation of one-third of state territory, which badly damaged 
transport and communication systems and resulted in the loss of markets for many 
enterprises. However, these circumstances were at the same time beneficial for those who 
got involved in fraudulent privatization deals and used the situation of war to their own 
advantage.  
According to Transparency International, the country‟s corruption perception 
index in 2003 was 3.7 and Croatia was ranked as 59 out of 133 countries.
138
 Another 
research conducted in the same period, showed that 65.8 per cent of people believed that 
corruption was very widespread in the country, while 32.9 per cent considered it merely 
widespread.
139
 In addition, Chief state attorney Radovan Ortynski was openly criticized 
by both the ruling and opposition parties for lack of progress in the fight against 
corruption and organized crime. In 2002, the Parliament rejected his annual report and 
after both the HDZ and the SDP voted for his removal, he was dismissed from all duties 
and replaced by Mladen Bajić. In the Parliament, Ortynski said that “every country has a 
mafia, but in Croatia, the mafia has the state” and later on claimed that the combination 
of mafia, politics and media pressure was responsible for his replacement.
140
 
 
4.4. Unresolved problems in the judiciary 
During Raĉan‟s term in office, the problems which had emerged in judiciary in the 
previous years have mostly remained unsolved. In 2003, Croatia had 250 courts and 
1,756 judges with the majority of court presidents and other representatives of legislative 
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branch appointed during Tudjman‟s term in office. Thus, there was constant resistance to 
possible changes and structural reforms in the legal system, mostly due to the 
unwillingness of judges to give up their high social and professional status and 
privileges.
141
 In addition, the existing legal framework which made it possible for judges 
to rarely schedule a trial hearing or unnecessarily extend the length between the trial 
hearings opened many opportunities for misuse of judicial powers. Thus, the 
government‟s positive measures mostly faced lack of implementation, which has only 
increased already existing problems, especially delays in proceedings.  
At this point, the judicial sector was still dealing with a great backlog of cases and 
the length of court procedures in civil and administrative courts posed a serious threat to 
citizens‟ legal security. The government‟s strategy to hire more judges and to delegate 
less demanding cases to public notaries was not particularly successful. In 2004, there 
were still 1,640,182 unresolved cases,
142
 and although many of them dated from pre-2000 
period, Raĉan‟s government failed to take necessary measures in order to reduce the 
backlog of cases and bring in needed improvements.  
At the same time, the local courts brought a number of cases against Croatian ex-
military personnel who allegedly had committed war crimes against the Serb population 
in the 1990‟s. However, many international as well as domestic non-governmental 
organizations and human rights observers have categorized these proceedings as slow and 
unsuccessful. The problematic aspect was that most of defendants were released because 
of lack of evidence. This was the case in 2002 with the Split „Lora‟ verdict and in 2003 
with the Gospić verdict; both of them were later on revoked by the Supreme Court and 
sent back for retrial. On the other hand, the Rijeka County Court sentenced Mirko Norac, 
accused of war crimes committed in Gospić in 1993, to 12 years in prison, proving that, 
in same cases, the Croatian judiciary has been to a certain extent ready to deal with war 
crimes committed by Croatian forces.
143
 At the same time, the number of so-called „in 
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absentia‟ prosecutions against the JNA and para-military Serb forces has largely 
decreased. Still, according to Freedom House, Croatia‟s score on judicial framework and 
independence in 2003 was 4.25, signifying a minor to moderate level of democratic 
progress in this field in the past two years.
144
 
 
4.5. Fundamental rights and freedom of expression 
During Raĉan‟s term in office, there have been some visible improvements in democratic 
atmosphere and fundamental rights issues in Croatia. The legal framework that 
guarantees the national minorities their basic rights has been further strengthened. In 
terms of legislation, the new 2001 Constitution and 2002 Constitutional Law on the 
Rights of National Minorities were adopted, as well as number of bilateral agreements 
regarding protection of national minorities in Croatia, Italy, Hungary, Serbia and 
Montenegro, etc. Thus, the position of national minorities, which according to official 
statistics in 2001 accounted for 7.5 per cent of the population in Croatia,
145
 has further 
improved. However, while the national minorities, such as Italians, Czechs, Slovaks and 
Hungarians have enjoyed fairly good treatment and high respect in regards to their 
ethnicity, culture and linguistics, the Serb and Roma minorities were still facing a number 
of problems during Raĉan‟s government term.  
According to the Croatian Helsinki Committee, the situation was especially 
difficult at the local level. The problems of the Serb minority have mostly included the 
following: returnee problems, property return issues, difficulties in finding jobs, and a 
high level of animosity in the local communities, including several verbal and physical 
attacks on returnees. On the other hand, Roma minority has mostly faced problems 
regarding extremely difficult living conditions, inadequate education and segregation, 
and a certain level of animosity in their local communities. The National Program for 
inclusion of the Roma minority in the local communities was carried out rather slowly.
146
 
According to official figures, since 1995 when the refugee return process started until 
2004, there were 330,727 returnees, from which majority was Croatian nationality 
(215,579) and only a smaller number of returnees were minorities, mostly Serbs 
                                                 
144
 Freedom House, Nations in Transit – Croatia 2003 Report.  
145
 OSCE, Mission to Croatia, Report on Croatia‟s Progress, 2006, pp. 7. 
146
 Croatian Helsinki Committee (Hrvatski Helsinški Odbor), „Godišnji izvještaj 2004', Zagreb 2005, pp. 6. 
 48 
(115,148), which return was complicated because of the property repossession and loss of 
tenancy rights issues. As mentioned, in 2001 around 10,000 Croatian Serb-owned houses 
were still occupied by temporary users and refugees from Bosanska Posavina who were 
at the same time facing strong barriers in their return process to Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
In addition, the government has not been efficient in providing alternative 
accommodations for refugees and displaced persons.
147
 Moreover, in 2004, around 60 per 
cent of Croats still believed that Serb return to Croatia would not be a good thing.
148
 
In terms of the media, the Croatia‟s media space was gradually democratizing 
after the democratic turnover in 2000. The next year, the government passed new laws 
and regulations regarding the media system, such as the Croatian News Agency Act and 
the Croatian Radio Television Act which transformed these media from state institutions 
into independent public institution/broadcaster. However, the legal framework left some 
space for political interference, since the HRT’s Board of Managers was mostly 
appointed by the Parliament and obtained delegated powers.
149
 However, many authors 
argue there was a noticeable shift in the political culture in relation to media system. The 
government was no longer dominating the media agenda and its content was less 
influenced by the state authorities.
150
 Moreover, the Nova TV started broadcasting in 2000 
and the RTL TV in 2004, creating a necessary competition for the HRT. This has provided 
pluralism of the media space and has opened media to more liberal standards. According 
to Freedom House rankings, the independent media scored 3.50 in 2001. In comparison 
to 1999, when the score was 5.00, this marks significant positive development in the field 
of independent media in Croatia.
151
 At the same time, it is very rare that a country 
experiences such a positive development in a short time. 
However, the problem of questionable court decisions against journalists, 
newspapers and publishers, mostly based on the so-called „emotional suffering‟ of 
members of the political and business elite, has remained. Especially problematic was 
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that defamation was still treated as a criminal offense with possible jail sentence. In 
addition, the HHO reported that the language of intolerance and hate-speech was still 
present in some Croatian media during 2001-2003 and mentioned Fokus and Hrvatsko 
slovo as newspapers lacking necessary professional standards, with Globus and Nacional 
as the biggest offenders with strong tendency toward sensationalism. Moreover, the 
Committee reported that the political pressure on the media had declined, but the media 
owners‟ pressure had increased as well as the vulnerability of the ordinary people in 
media coverage.
152
 This widespread practice of creating scandals and sensationalism was 
partly a consequence of an increasing commercialization of the media space, which made 
the media vulnerable to various commercial interests of the media owners. At the same 
time, the lack of professionalism was also present in cases of reporting on the fight 
against corruption and organized crime. 
 
4.6. Račan’s prime ministership: Summarizing the main features 
The 2000 coalition parties gathered mostly in order to fulfill one goal – to push the ruling 
HDZ out of power. The coalition government lacked clearly articulated goals and was 
often paralyzed by intra-coalition disputes and opposition parties‟ actions, as in the case 
of cooperation with the ICTY. In addition, although a good legal framework was set out 
in many areas, such as the media sphere and the fight against corruption and organized 
crime, actual implementation failed, and necessary structural reforms, especially in 
judiciary had not taken place. Moreover, the government failed to reduce the 
unemployment and improve the living standards of its citizens. However, Raĉan‟s 
government has also brought some positive democratic changes, such as turning the 
country into a parliamentary democracy and taking it out of international isolation and 
closer to the EU membership. 
At the same time and as previously mentioned, the 2000 elections also opened a 
space for Croatia to deepen and consolidate its democracy. Although Croatian democracy 
was still fragile at this point, and political elites as well as citizens were not entirely 
complying with the basic rules of democratic game in early 2000, this situation had 
changed slightly by the end of 2003. At this point, it was possible to argue that 
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democratic institutions were stable and basic rules respected, and in spite of sporadic 
undemocratic incidents, there was no a real danger that democracy might collapse. 
However, the danger of a silent erosion of democracy was still present. In addition, 
although domestic adoption costs were still high for Raĉan‟s government, it was possible 
to observe a certain impact of the EU‟s political conditionality approach on democratic 
reforms and consolidation in the country. This also confirms Schimmelfenning‟s 
suggestion that, in order for external factors, such was the EU, to exert their influence on 
domestic politics in the country, the liberal parties must be in power. 
 
 51 
5. Sanader’s prime ministership (2003-2009) 
 
Under the leadership of Ivo Sanader, the HDZ gradually reformed itself into a modern 
pro-European democratic party and became a member of the European People‟s Party 
(EPP). The HDZ came back to power as a result of the November 2003 parliamentary 
elections, mainly due to unsolved economic problems. Although the GDP had grown in 
the early 2000s, mostly because of good tourist seasons, the state debt had further 
increased, reaching 23,5 billion US dollars in 2003, which was at that point 53.2 per cent 
of the state GDP. In addition, unemployment rate has reached almost 20 per cent, which 
was the highest level in the past ten years.
153
 Hence, although the SDP and its coalition 
partners succeeded in moving the country closer to the EU, they had failed in reviving the 
economy and improving living standards of Croatian citizens. As Raĉan has said, “in 
2000, the HDZ helped us to gain the power, so in 2003 we helped the HDZ to regain 
power.”154  
 
5.1. Dealing with Tudjman’s legacy 
After the elections, the international community was mostly concerned with the idea that 
Croatia could get a right-oriented government, if the HSP and its leader Anto Đapić 
participated in Sanader‟s office. Thus, both Washington and Brussels threatened Croatia 
with international isolation if the HSP entered the government.
155
 The result was a 
coalition government between the HDZ and HSLS, DC, HSS, HSU and national 
minorities‟ representatives. In addition, Sanader‟s government became a strong advocate 
of Croatia‟s EU membership and was keen to continue with necessary political and 
economic reforms, which at the same time supported the logic of so-called „lock-in-
effect‟ and path dependency. Thus, not only did the HDZ reform into a modern political 
party, but it has also stayed in the same EU course as the liberal parties had previously. 
Besides, there was a broad political consensus that EU membership is of vital national 
interest. It is possible to argue that, at this point, the Croatian political party space has 
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transformed, creating a desirable liberal party constellation in Croatia and increasing the 
possible impact of EU‟s political conditionality. 
Dr. Ivo Sanader (b.1953) was a prominent HDZ member, who succeeded in 
building the image of a modern European politician, with perfection in foreign languages. 
However, he was also quite authoritarian in leading the government as well as his party, 
and did not allow decisions to be made without his knowledge.
156
 However, in order to 
bring Croatia into the EU, Sanader was ready to deal with the issue of Tudjman‟s legacy 
and Croatia‟s recent past. During his term in office, the word „de-tudjmanization‟ 
(‘Detudjmanizacija’) was used more frequently. Sanader‟s government improved the 
level of cooperation with the ICTY and his personal approach in handling new 
indictments against Croatian military personnel was welcomed by the international 
community, namely the EU and the US as well as the ICTY‟s chief prosecutor. In 
addition, Sanader‟s government was also building closer ties with Serbia and Montenegro 
and, at the end of 2004, Sanader was the first prime minister of independent Croatia to 
pay an official visit to Serbia. Moreover, he was willing to carry out the necessary 
political and economic reforms as well as to improve relations with the Serb minority in 
Croatia. At this point, Croatia surely represented a positive example among Southeast 
European countries that the international community has desperately looked for. 
 
5.2. Cooperation with the ICTY 
In March 2004, the ICTY released new indictments against six Bosnian Croat military 
officers, accused of war crimes during the Croat-Muslim conflict in Bosnia
157
 and against 
Croatian military officers Ivan Ĉermak and Mladen Markaĉ, accused of war crimes 
during the Operation Storm. All of them handed themselves in voluntarily and, unlike in 
Raĉan‟s time, there were no massive protests organized by veteran‟s movements or 
nationalist right-wing parties. However, an unresolved „Gotovina issue‟ became a main 
obstacle to Croatia‟s accession in the EU. In order to prove its full cooperation with the 
ICTY, Croatia was expected to arrest and transfer Gotovina to the Hague‟s custody. In 
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April 2004, Croatia gained a candidate country status, regardless of the resistance of 
some of the EU member states. The ratification of the SAA in member states‟ 
parliaments continued as well, and in February 2005, after the Dutch and the British 
parliaments ratified it, the Agreement entered into force. 
However, some of the key European players strongly opposed Croatian admission 
to the EU and the pressure regarding Gotovina‟s arrest continued.158 In addition, the 
ICTY‟s chief prosecutor Carla Del Ponte claimed that Gotovina was hiding in Croatia 
and that Sanader‟s government was providing him a shelter. Del Ponte even accused the 
Catholic Church structures in Croatia of complicity and claimed that Gotovina was hiding 
in a Franciscan monastery. However, the Croatian bishop denied these accusations. The 
statement that Vatican itself was protecting Gotovina was probably the peak of del 
Ponte‟s accusations.159 At the same time, Sanader insisted that Gotovina was not hiding 
in Croatia, but his statements were not perceived as trustworthy among some EU member 
states. In March 2005, due to lack of cooperation with the ICTY, the EU postponed the 
official opening of Croatia‟s negotiation talks. In particular, the Netherlands and the UK 
adopted a strong stance against Croatia. The UK‟s minister for Europe, Denis MacShane 
stated that “Britain would not vote for a positive EC opinion as long as the Gotovina case 
remained unsolved.”160 These two countries were at this point joined by Germany, France 
and Italy, while Slovakia, Hungary, Austria and Slovenia were still strong advocates of 
Croatia‟s opening of negotiation talks. Some argued that the opening of negotiation talks 
without Gotovina in prison, would only send negative signals to other Southeast 
European countries that also needed to fulfill their obligations toward the ICTY, namely 
Serbia. 
As Ramet and Søberg argue, Sanader‟s government strongly believed that Croatia 
had fulfilled all necessary criteria for EU membership, and that the country would not be 
put on hold only because of the failure to arrest Gotovina.
161
 However, after the opening 
of negotiation talks was postponed, the Croatian government took the Gotovina issue 
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more seriously and introduced an „Action Plan‟. The plan aimed at locating and arresting 
Gotovina as well as at shutting down his financial support network. In addition, two 
persons were arrested on charges of having provided Gotovina with a forged passport. 
These actions resulted in a positive change in the ICTY‟s opinion and Del Ponte reported 
that Croatia was fully cooperating with the ICTY. In October 2005, Croatia officially 
opened negotiation talks and two months later Gotovina was arrested at Tenerife, Spain, 
thanks to crucial information the Croatian government provided some months previous. 
Although the Gotovina case temporarily damaged Croatia‟s reputation, Ramet and 
Søberg argue that at this point, after years of suspicion, Croatia was finally treated like a 
reliable partner.
162
 For sure, Croatia fostered its international position and became a 
factor of stability in the Southeastern Europe. Moreover, the Gotovina case once again 
proved that the EU‟s political conditionality approach works, especially in a decisive 
phase of negotiation talks. In order to prove its cooperation with the ICTY and open 
negotiation talks, the government had taken the necessary steps to arrest Gotovina and 
thus, had complied with the EU requirements. However, Croatia‟s cooperation with the 
ICTY remained a politically controversial question in the following years as well. 
Subsequent developments also contributed to increased euro-skepticism among 
Croatian citizens. In March 2005, the support for EU membership was 45 per cent, but 
declined to only 28 per cent in September 2005.
163
 Fisher argues that various Croatian 
governments, which labeled unpopular reforms as strictly European, take part of the 
blame for this decline since they failed to clarify that Croatia had to take these reforms 
anyhow.
164
 However, the roots of Croatian euro-skepticism are deeper than that. As 
Ramet and Søberg argue, part of the problem was the EU‟s neo-Titoist policy of 
balancing guilt between Croatia and Serbia. Thus, many Croats feared that the EU aimed 
at postponing Croatia‟s accession talks until Serbia would be ready for EU membership. 
In addition, the EU‟s treatment of Mladić, Karadţić and Gotovina as moral equivalents 
was offensive to all Croats, as was the ICTY‟s characterization of Operation Storm as a 
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„joint criminal enterprise‟ with more than 1,000 government officials included.165 Finally, 
the EU‟s approach toward Croatia and its recent past touched directly upon the questions 
of statehood and national identity, and thus, created strong anti-EU attitudes and 
frustration with EU policies among many Croats. 
 
5.3. The fight against Corruption and Sanader’s second term in office 
In order to deal more efficiently with corruption and restore citizens‟ trust in the state 
institutions, Sanader‟s government improved the legal framework by adopting a package 
of anti-corruption laws, including: the Conflict of Interest Prevention Act, the Corporate 
Criminal Liability Act, the Witness Protection Act, the Right to Access to Information 
Act, and several others. In addition, Croatia has signed and ratified the UN Convention 
against Corruption and improved its international cooperation in the relevant fields. In 
2005, the government introduced a rigorous anti-corruption program: the National Anti-
Corruption Program for 2006-2008, which was adopted by the Parliament in March 2006. 
The overreaching goal of the program was to reduce corruption to a level where it would 
no longer be an obstacle to the social, economic and political development of the country. 
In order to increase transparency in business and public administration, the program also 
introduced the so-called „one-stop-shop‟ service Hitro.hr. Moreover, the judiciary, the 
health care system, local self-government and public administration were detected as 
main fields to address.
166
 In addition, the privatization concept was changed and the 
model of non-transparent sale of state enterprises was abandoned. At this point, all 
interested parties had a free access to capital markets. In 2007, Croatian citizens obtained 
the opportunity to buy stocks of the Croatian oil company INA and the Croatian 
telecommunication company HT.
167
 
However, regardless of the fairly good legal framework, the actual 
implementation was highly problematic. According to Transparency International, the 
corruption perception index in Croatia, in 2006 was 3.4, as high as in previous years.
168
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This implies that the government was not doing enough in order to change the perception 
of corruption and increase citizens‟ trust in state institutions.  
Moreover, government officials were also involved in some corruption scandals. 
The minister of foreign affairs Miomir Ţuţul was forced to resign in 2005, after a series 
of newspaper articles about his alleged involvement in various corruption scandals. It was 
the first time that a senior official was forced to step down because of charges of conflict 
of interests and public pressure. In 2006, Sanader was involved in the so-called „Verona 
Affair‟, when the opposition accused him of fixing the sale of the Croatian 
pharmaceutical company Pliva to the American company Barr. However, this was never 
proven and Sanader himself denied these accusations.
169
 A major corruption scandal 
occurred in 2007, when three vice-presidents of the Croatian Privatization Fund were 
arrested for having secured privileged arrangements for some private companies. 
Although the government announced that there could be possible further arrests on a 
high-level, this did not happen during Sanader‟s term in office.170 At the same time, the 
police arrests as well as criminal prosecutions against persons involved in corruption and 
organized crime were generally rare, and often ended in the discharge of all allegations. 
In 2007, despite these accusations and a lack of fight against corruption, 
Sanader‟s government succeeded in obtaining a new four-year mandate. While the SDP, 
under the leadership of Zoran Milanović,171 based its campaign on a promise of 
eliminating the right to vote for those not living in the country (‘diaspora’), the HDZ 
personalized its campaign and simply said ‘Let’s move on’ (‘Idemo dalje’), capitalizing 
its previous success, mostly in relation to the EU‟s accession negotiations. Although 
Mesić172 was hesitant in deciding who would get the mandate to form a government, 
Sanader succeeded in recruiting the support of the HSS, HSLS and HSU as well as 
minority representatives and thus, attained his second term in office. 
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Moreover, the 2007 elections were specific for there things: (1) the two biggest parties, 
the HDZ and the SDP won 122 out of 153 seats in the Parliament, which was almost 80 
per cent of all seats. This result has showed clear polarization of the Croatian political 
scene; (2) the right-wing party HSP won 3.47 per cent of votes and only 1 seat in the 
Parliament. In comparison to the previous elections, when the party won 6.46 per cent of 
votes and 8 seats in the Parliament, this was more than an obvious drop. At this point, the 
HSP and its leader Anto Djapić were practically pushed to the margins of political 
influence in the country. As in the 2003 elections, other right-wing parties won less than 
1 per cent of votes and did not even enter the Parliament.
173
 As Goldstein argues, right 
radicalism in Croatia became a phenomenon that works on similar patterns as in other 
European countries – these radical circles occasionally succeed in stirring up media 
attention and creating an impression of their strength, but they remain unsuccessful in 
confirming this in elections.
174
 (3) And finally, it was the first time that Roma minority 
got their representative in the Croatian Parliament and participated in the government 
decisions.  
Sanader‟s second government continued its pro-European policies and, in the 
following years Croatia succeeded in achieving remarkable international success and 
further strengthened its position in the region and the world. In 2007, the country was 
elected a non-permanent UN Security Council member and the OSCE mission in Croatia 
ended its mandate; in 2009, Croatia became a member of NATO. With that, the country 
reached its high point in foreign policy and one of the two main foreign political goals 
was accomplished. In addition, the 2006 OSCE report on Croatia‟s progress stated that 
the country had experienced positive developments and continuous improvements in the 
democratic atmosphere over the past years, especially with respect to responsiveness to 
reforms based on international commitments, the fight against corruption, the securing of 
media freedom and national minority groups.
175
 However, in 2008 Croatian public was 
shaken by the murder of Ivana Hodak, a daughter of the well-known lawyer Zvonimir 
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Hodak. At first, the murder was related to the case of Hodak‟s client, Vladimir Zagorec, 
who was arrested in Austria and extradited to Croatia‟s custody.176 Later on, the murder 
was attributed to a homeless man blaming her father, Zvonimir Hodak for his problems in 
life. In March 2010, he was sentenced to 30 years in prison. After Hodak‟s murder, the 
chief of Zagreb‟s police department Marijan Benko, minister of interior affairs Berislav 
Ronĉević and minister or justice Ana Lovrin were forced to withdraw. Their positions 
were taken by Tomislav Karamarko and Ivan Šimonović, who were perceived as 
professionals, free from political influence. Therefore, this government‟s action was 
welcomed by the international community as well.  
 
5.4. Small improvements in the judiciary 
During Sanader‟s term in office, the judiciary was still facing several problems: the 
problem of corruption, a large backlog of cases, a high share of long procedures and war 
crime issues. Croatian minister of justice, Ana Lovrin, explicitly said that the judiciary 
was one of the most corrupted sectors in the country. Therefore, in order to make the 
courts‟ work more transparent, the government introduced a number of reforms to fight 
corruption in the judiciary, including property cards for judges, as well as a reform of the 
land registers.
177
 The latter reform, which included the necessary modernization and 
digitalization of data, has limited possible manipulations in this area and thus, represented 
an important measure of judicial reform in general. In addition, the government‟s plan 
was to analyze the network of courts and state attorney‟s offices, relocate a certain 
amount of cases from overburdened to less burdened courts and assure necessary 
mechanisms to monitor the implementation of criteria for the appointment and promotion 
of judges.
178
 
According to the 2006 Freedom House Report, Croatia had 110 misdemeanor, 
106 municipal, 21 county, and 12 commercial courts, as well as 1,907 judges which 
placed it among European states with the highest number of courts and judges in 
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proportion to the total population.
179
 Therefore, in order to rationalize the network of 
courts, the Parliament adopted a new Law on Courts in December 2005. Moreover, in 
January 2006, the Parliament passed the Judicial Reform Strategy and its Action Plan for 
2006-2010 period. The main goal was to strengthen the rule of law, independence and 
efficiency of the judiciary. In order to achieve that, the government set out several 
preconditions, including: the further reduction of the backlog of unresolved cases, the 
enhancement of professionalism through quality training of judges and court officials, 
and the full enforcement of court decisions. Although the government had reduced the 
amount of backlog of cases in the previous years, Croatia still had to deal with 1,032,305 
unresolved court cases in 2006,
180
 which presents a direct violation of citizens‟ right to 
have their trials scheduled in a reasonable time. As Matić argues, the judiciary was still in 
general “characterized by a shortage of experience and knowledge, poor decision making 
and prolonged court cases that infringe upon the citizen‟s right to a trial within a 
reasonable period of time.”181 
At the same time, Croatia has demonstrated the political will as well as the 
judicial capacity to conduct war crime prosecutions against Croatian military personnel. 
In 2005, the ICTY transferred the Ademi case as well as the Norac case to the Croatian 
justice system, as a part of its „Completion Strategy‟. In these cases, both Rahim Ademi 
and Mirko Norac were accused of war crimes committed in the military operation Medak 
Pocket in 1993. These trials were an important test for the Croatian judiciary to 
demonstrate its readiness to deal efficiently with issues of war crimes committed by 
Croatian military personnel. In 2008, the Zagreb County Court sentenced Norac to seven 
years in prison, while Ademi was acquitted of all charges. At this point, Norac and 
Ademi were the highest-ranking military personnel to be tried in Croatia. At the same 
time, the Split County Court has conducted a new trial in the Lora case, while the 
previous judge was removed from retrial proceedings. In the 2006 retrial, the court 
convicted eight former Croatian soldiers of having committed a war crime in Split‟s 
prison Lora in the early 1990‟s. The trials led to positive remarks from the international 
community and other non-governmental organizations, since Croatia had demonstrated 
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the political will as well as its judiciary‟s capacity to conduct war crime prosecutions 
against Croatian military personnel. Another important step forward was increased 
regional cooperation in the prosecution of war crimes between Chief state attorneys of 
Croatia, and those of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro. At the same 
time, Serb indictees accused of war crimes against the Croatian population had a better 
chance of receiving a fair trial than had been the case in the past. 
 
5.5. Fundamental rights and freedom of expression 
During Sanader‟s term in office, there were further improvements in terms of democratic 
atmosphere, tolerance and fundamental rights issues in Croatia. The important step in that 
direction was the Sarajevo Declaration, signed in January 2005 by Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro. This declaration set up the road in the regional 
process of refuge return, which included housing care, repossession and reconstruction of 
property. According to the OSCE 2006 Report, more than 120,000 Croatian Serb 
refugees had returned to Croatia. In addition, the state rebuilt 140,000 out of 190,000 
destroyed properties and the Croatian Serb returnees were major beneficiaries of these 
policies. Another significant improvement occurred in regard to repossession of private 
property. In April 2006, only 219 Croatian Serb houses were still occupied, compared to 
10,000 in 2001 and 19,500 in 1995 on the whole.
182
 
At the same time, Croatian government continued with the implementation of a 
housing program for former tenancy rights holders. In the period 2007-2009, the 
government‟s program provided housing for 4,900 former tenancy rights holders. The 
target for 2009 was additional 2,070 flats, from which the state secured 1,300 available 
housing units (62.8 per cent) and 1,024 have been handed over (49.5 per cent).
183
 
Moreover, a joint list between Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia and 
Montenegro on 2,500 missing persons from Croatia was finally reached. 
In addition, in both the 2003 and 2007 parliamentary elections, national minorities 
obtained eight representatives in Croatian Parliament, and they were an important part of 
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government‟s ruling coalition. As aforementioned, in the 2007 parliamentary elections 
the Roma minority got their first representative in the Parliament and became the 
government‟s coalition partner with other minority representatives. In 2008, the Roma 
representative Nazif Memedi highlighted his good cooperation with Croatia‟s authorities 
in solving the problems of the Roma minority. From 2004 to 2008, the number of Roma 
children in primary schools tripled, 280 Roma pupils reached the final year of high 
school and 11 Roma students were studying at the universities. In addition, the 
infrastructural problems were solved in many Roma settlements and six of them had been 
legalized. Besides, the government has provided a certain amount of financial aid for 
Roma employment.
184
 However, Croatia still had to address some problems in terms of 
inclusion of national minorities in the state administration, the judiciary and public 
institutions. According to the OSCE, national minorities constituted only about five per 
cent of all judges in 2005 and about four per cent of Croatia‟s 52,000 civil servants in 
2006.
185
 
In the media sphere, the political pressures were lower than in the 1990‟s, but they 
have never completely stopped. There were frequent attempts to control the media 
through some suitable editorial structure, as in the case of the public service broadcaster, 
the HRT. In addition, Sanader‟s government was increasingly using the new spin 
technologies and old „party channel control-the-editor-who-controls-the-program‟ 
techniques to ensure a positive presentation of its policies.
186
 On the other hand, 
commercial TV‟s, such as Nova TV and RTL were often pressed by commercial interests 
and ownerships‟ attempts to influence their editorial programs as well. 
At the same time, there were several physical attacks on journalists covering 
issues of war crimes and corruption. In 2008, a prominent journalist of the daily 
newspaper Jutarnji list Dušan Miljuš was seriously beaten up, due to his articles about 
corruption in business and politics.
187
 Moreover, in October 2008, a journalist and a 
publisher of the weekly magazine Nacional, Ivo Pukanić, as well as a marketing manager 
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Niko Franjić were murdered by a bomb planted on a motorcycle and parked in a front of 
Nacional magazine‟s premises.188 All of these cases were directly related to and 
committed by organized crime groups. 
In addition, there were several judicial cases against Croatian journalists led by 
the ICTY. In August 2006, a journalist of the daily newspaper Slobodna Dalmacija Josip 
Jović was fined 20,000 euros for having revealed the name of president Mesić as a 
protected witness in the Blaškić trial in 1997. In addition, in 2007 an independent 
journalist Domagoj Margetić was fined 10,000 euros and three months in prison for 
having revealed the identity of several protected witnesses. The same practice continued 
in the years afterwards, when a number of journalists were questioned for publishing the 
ICTY‟s trial documents. The Reporters Without Borders classified these procedures as 
setting a disturbing precedent and violation of press freedom.
189
 
 
5.6. Sanader’s prime ministership: Summarizing the main features 
During his first term in office, Sanader succeeded in bringing Croatia closer to the EU 
membership. There were several reasons for that: (1) Sanader was ready to deal with 
Tudjman‟s legacy and Croatia‟s recent past, (2) he improved the cooperation with the 
ICTY and (3), he was ready to build closer relations with the neighboring countries as 
well as with national minorities in Croatia, especially the Serb minority. Moreover, it was 
the first time that representatives of the national minorities participated in the 
government.  
However, Sanader failed in dealing with a couple of things, which turned into a 
heavy burden during his second term in office: (1) regardless a fairly good legal 
framework, the substantial fight against corruption never took place, (2) judicial reform, 
especially in terms of reduction of backlog of cases, was progressing rather slowly and 
(3), the economic problems further emerged, especially with the global economic and 
financial crisis in 2008. Moreover, after several achievements in foreign policy, Croatia 
faced serious problems in terms of its international position: the EU‟s negotiation talks 
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were blocked because of open bilateral issues with Slovenia and lack of cooperation with 
the ICTY in terms of the so-called „artillery documents‟ (‘topnički dnevnici’).190 
To conclude, having in mind Linz‟s and Stepan‟s as well as Schedler‟s criteria of 
measuring democratic consolidation, it is possible to argue that during Sanader‟s term in 
office Croatia was functioning as a consolidated democracy. The democratic institutions 
were stable and there was a widespread respect for democratic rules of the game by the 
political elites as well as Croatian citizens. At the same time, it was obvious that the EU 
had taken a tougher approach toward Croatia than it had toward some other post-
communist countries, such as Romania and Bulgaria, believing the country could serve as 
a positive example for other Southeast European countries. In addition, the EU‟s political 
conditionality approach was an effective tool in forcing the country to take necessary 
democratic reforms, especially prior to official opening of accession negotiations and in 
terms of the ICTY cooperation. Thus, it was possible to observe the EU‟s positive impact 
on democratic changes and consolidation in the country.  
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6. Kosor’s prime ministership (2009-in progress) 
 
During Sanader‟s second term in office, public support for the government‟s actions was 
declining, mostly due to a deep recession into which Croatia had slid as well as unsolved 
corruption issues. In July 2009, Sanader suddenly resigned as prime minister and as party 
president, and decided to withdraw from active politics. This decision came as a surprise 
since Sanader‟s name had often been mentioned in the context of forthcoming 
presidential elections, as a potential HDZ presidential candidate. At the same time, he did 
not provide any reasonable explanation for his resignation, thus opening space for various 
speculations about the reason for his resignation: among the reasons suggested were 
pressure from the international community, the border dispute with Slovenia and lack of 
support from his European partners, the blockade of EU accession negotiations, the 
economic situation in the country for which he did not want to take responsibility, and so 
on. However, recent investigations revealed his role in some of the corruption scandals, 
which suggests that the reason he resigned could also have been an attempt to escape 
criminal prosecution.
191
 
 
6.1. Kosor’s term in office and European integration issues 
In July 2009, after Sanader resigned Jadranka Kosor took over the prime minister‟s 
position. Jadranka Kosor (b.1953) had been a close associate of Ivo Sanader and the 
HDZ‟s presidential candidate in 2005 presidential elections. The opposition leaders 
claimed that Kosor did not have a mandate to lead the government and demanded early 
elections. However, after Kosor was confirmed in the Parliament, she became Croatia‟s 
first female prime minister. Already in summer 2009, Kosor‟s political approach largely 
contributed to a more positive atmosphere in Croatian-Slovenian bilateral relations. The 
governments agreed that the border dispute would be solved at the arbitral tribunal, and 
both Parliaments ratified this agreement. This was an important step forward that led to 
the unblocking of Croatia‟s accession negotiations. In addition, Kosor‟s government had 
to face other challenges as well, such as: the fight against corruption, cooperation with 
the ICTY, and domestic economic problems. 
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In January 2010, when Kosor personally stopped Sanader‟s attempt to return to active 
politics and evicted him from the party, her position was further strengthened. The 
resolution of the Sanader case, the end of tensions with Slovenia, and her readiness to 
deal openly with corruption issues in state enterprises, led to high public support for 
Kosor‟s government. By January 2010, 55.2 per cent of people supported the 
government‟s work, which was the highest public support since the last parliamentary 
elections in 2007. Moreover, Kosor was the most positive political figure for 21.5 per 
cent of people, while Mesić dropped to second place and the SDP‟s presidential candidate 
Ivo Josipović was third.192 
Although Croatia had missed the opportunity to catch up with other Central 
European countries on their way toward EU, many Croats had expected that it could still 
join Romania and Bulgaria in the second round of EU enlargement in 2007. However, 
Croatia‟s accession was first extended to 2009 and then to 2010, later to 2011, pushing 
the final date ever further away. Currently, the Government‟s intention is to finish 
negotiations by the summer 2011. In its annual strategy report for 2010-2011, the EU 
stated that Croatia is progressing well in meeting EU requirements, and there is a good 
degree of compatibility with EU rules in most areas.
193
 In April 2011, the EU 
Enlargement Commissioner stated that the closure of Croatia‟s negotiations was „within 
reach‟, but stressed that further efforts needed to be taken in the field of judicial reform, 
the fight against corruption, and full cooperation with the ICTY.
194
 At the same time, 
while Croatia is closer to entering the EU than ever before, the latest public opinion poll 
conducted in May 2011, showed that only 44.6 per cent support Croatia‟s membership in 
the EU, which is the lowest support in the last five years, while 41.8 per cent were 
opposed to it.
195
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6.2. The issue of cooperation with the ICTY as a never ending story 
In December 2005, when Gotovina was arrested, it seemed that Croatia had successfully 
completed the last condition regarding its cooperation with the ICTY. However, new 
requirements were gradually added in the years afterwards. In 2008, the ICTY demanded 
the surrender of the „artillery documents‟ (topnički dnevnici) from Operation Storm, 
which the Croatian government claimed had been lost. This proved to be yet another 
reason for the ICTY‟s negative report and for the postponement of Croatia‟s accession 
negotiations until February 2010.
196
  
Having in mind these developments at the ICTY, it is possible to observe 
continuous tension between the ICTY‟s chief prosecutor‟s office and the Croatian 
governments, where the blame was not always entirely on the Croatian side. The ICTY 
and especially the chief prosecutor‟s office197, deserve an important part of the blame as 
well. Cooperation with the ICTY has always been presented as a highly-relevant political 
concern and the necessary shift from the political to the legal arena, where it belongs, has 
never happened. In addition, the hot debates prior to the official visit of the ICTY‟s chief 
prosecutor to Croatia were common, as well as anxiety and lobbying attempts prior to the 
official report on Croatia‟s cooperation with the ICTY. Moreover, the chief prosecutor 
would always be hosted on the highest state level, by the president and prime minister, 
which gave this function an apparent significance that, on its own merits, it never should 
have had. Although in 2005, when Gotovina was arrested, it appeared that the shift from 
the political to the legal arena would finally take place, the „artillery documents‟ became 
another obstacle on Croatia‟s path toward EU membership as already mentioned. 
Moreover, „the full cooperation‟ phrase, frequently used by the ICTY and other 
international actors has become a rather vague term, very often applied broadly and 
whenever possible. 
In addition, the ICTY‟s verdict against Gotovina and Markaĉ in April 2011 
represented another challenge for Kosor‟s government. The ICTY for the most part 
                                                 
196
 In 2008, the ICTY‟s chief prosecutor‟s office requested a number of „artillery documents‟ on number of 
shells used during the Operation Storm. The Croatian government has submitted some of them, while 
others appeared gradually and some were never found. In 2010, the ICTY Court Chamber eventually 
denied Chief prosecutor‟s request on Croatia to deliver artillery documents. 
197
 Carla del Ponte was appointed the ICTY's chief prosecutor in August 1999. In January 2008, she was 
succeeded by Serge Brammertz. 
 67 
accepted the implications about the „joint criminal enterprise‟ stated in the indictments, 
and sentenced Gotovina to 24 years and Markaĉ to 18 years in prison for war crimes 
committed during Operation Storm in the summer 1995. The verdict provoked 
consternation in the country including among high state officials; President Josipović198 
and Prime Minister Kosor said that the verdict with the implication of „joint criminal 
enterprise‟ was unacceptable for Croatia. They have, however, stressed that Croatia 
respects the rule of law and thus, the state authorities will consider possible legal actions 
to annul these unacceptable implications.
199
 A similar reaction came from the leaders of 
the majority of opposition parties as well.  
On the other hand, the veterans‟ movements and some right-wing party leaders 
claimed that the ICTY verdict against Gotovina and Markaĉ was more than just a verdict 
against Croatian generals but was a verdict against the Homeland War, the Croatian 
people, and the Croatian state as such. They organized mass protests in all major cities in 
Croatia, including Zagreb, Rijeka, Split, and Osijek, in order to show their disagreement 
with the ICTY‟s verdicts. The Zagreb protest drew around 30,000 people, where 
protesters called for political responsibility on the part of present as well as previous 
Croatian political leaders, calling the verdict and the political elite‟s actions treasonous. 
At the same time, the street protests erupted into fury against the EU and demanded an 
end to accession negotiations. The support for EU membership at that point dropped from 
60 per cent to 38 per cent, while 90 per cent of respondents said they felt bitter and 93 per 
cent described the verdict as unfair.
200
 
According to Pavlaković, there are several controversies regarding the work of the 
ICTY: (1) first, accusations regarding the planned ethnic cleansing during the Operation 
Storm suggest that the casualties were not merely side effects but the intended goal of 
military actions, (2) second, the sources used by the tribunal are questionable since the 
ICTY relied heavily on statistics provided by „Veritas‟ and Savo Štrbac, well-known for 
his anti-Croat propaganda, based on the allegedly „genocidal nature of Croats‟. In 
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addition, the number of killed that „Veritas‟ provided for the ICTY was in excess of 
1,500 people and included persons who were alive or who had died of natural causes. On 
the other hand, the Croatian Helsinki Committee documented a total of 667 victims; (3) 
third, the perception of the ICTY as a source of „historical truth‟ about the 1990‟s wars; 
(4) fourth, the idea of „joint criminal enterprise‟, which contradicts the tribunal 
fundamental principle of individual responsibility, as well as international law and 
finally, (5) the construction of the ICTY as a „political court‟.201 Although the court was 
founded by the UN, it is not completely financed from the UN budget, but relies also on 
funding from some governments and private organizations. Thus, having in mind how the 
ICTY is financed and the context in which the court was established in the early 1990‟s, 
there is certainly a political element in its work. However, according to Marijan 
Damaška, the prominent law expert and professor at Yale University, it would be dubious 
to claim that judges are making decisions based on politics rather than on the basis of 
evidence presented within a judicial framework.
202
 
 
6.3. The fight against corruption stronger than ever 
The economic crisis in Croatia, which started during Sanader‟s time, has continued 
during Kosor‟s term in office as well. The Croatian economy has been strongly affected 
by the global economic and financial crisis. The rate of GDP growth has fallen to -5.8 per 
cent in 2009, while unemployment increased to 17 per cent. At the same time, the 
external debt increased rapidly over the past years, and in 2009 it reached 97.4 per cent of 
the GDP.
203
 The situation improved slightly in the year afterward, with a GDP growth of 
1.4 per cent. However, unemployment increased as well, exceeding 18 per cent, while the 
state debt threatened to reach the level of almost 100 per cent of the GDP. This trend is 
expected to continue in 2011 as well.
204
 Having in mind these figures, the economic 
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situation and the standard of living in Croatia remain important challenges for Kosor‟s 
government. 
At the same time, the government has made an important step forward in the fight 
against corruption and organized crime. During Kosor‟s term in office, a number of 
people involved in corruption and other criminal activities were arrested, including ex-
vice-president of the Government, Damir Polanĉec, the HDZ party treasurer and a head 
of the Croatian Custom Service, Mladen Barišić, and ex-minister of defense and internal 
affairs, Berislav Ronĉević.205 In addition, several senior officials and executives of 
national highway and railroad companies as well as university professors were 
investigated and accused of corruption as well. These actions culminated in the arrest and 
detention of the former prime minister Ivo Sanader in Austria, in December 2010. 
Sanader is suspected of having conspired to commit crime and abuse of power in several 
corruption cases, and awaiting extradition. Kosor‟s government has opened a number of 
high-level corruption investigations and made it quite clear that no one is untouchable in 
the fight against corruption, demonstrating the government‟s policy of zero tolerance for 
corruption. 
The high-level corruption cases have revealed that corruption has been deeply 
rooted in Croatian society, but at the same time, it demonstrated the government‟s will to 
finally deal with widespread corruption cases. In addition, these actions have shown that 
implementation of anti-corruption measures has improved in the past years, especially 
after Kosor took over the prime minister‟s office. At the same time, the recent positive 
developments in the fight against corruption were also recognized by the international 
community. The EU has especially pointed out that the number of court verdicts 
increased, unlike in previous years when many accused were released because of lack of 
evidence. However, the problem of preventing conflicts of interests and the further 
enhancement of professionalism of the police service have remained important tasks for 
Kosor‟s government.206  
In order to enhance the professionalism of the police, the Croatian Parliament 
adopted a new Police Act in March 2011. The Act introduces a more transparent system 
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of evaluation, promotion, and rewards in the police. At the same time, it prohibits police 
officers from being members of political parties, carrying out any political activities 
within their service, and competing in state or local elections. In addition, it encourages 
merit-based instead of political appointments, since the General Police Director‟s 
position must be obtained through a public vacancy announcement and other positions 
within the police through an internal vacancy announcement. Having this in mind, it is 
possible to observe strong EU pressure as well as the government‟s willingness to 
comply with EU requirements in the final phase of the accession negotiations. 
In addition, according to Transparency International, the corruption index in 2010 
in Croatia was 4.1, which suggests that the perception on corruption has changed slightly 
for the better over the past years, in comparison to 2006 when corruption index was 3.4. 
Thus, it is possible to observe a changing perception of the country‟s performance in the 
past years. At the same time, in 2009, 71 per cent of respondents believed that the 
government‟s measures in the fight against corruption had not been successful, while 
only 16 per cent thought these measures had been successful. A year later, 56 per cent 
believed these measures had not been successful, while 28 per cent believed they had 
been, signifying that the government‟s policies in the fight against corruption had 
achieved certain positive results. However, in 2010, the general public still perceived the 
judiciary as the most corrupt sector in Croatia, and 57 per cent of people had the 
impression that the level of corruption over the previous three years had increased, while 
33 per cent expressed the view that it had remained the same, and only 10 per cent 
believed it had decreased.
207
 It is important to keep in mind that any substantial changes 
in the perception of corruption are likely to emerge only over a longer period of time. 
Moreover, in order to increase efficiency in disclosing as well as prosecuting 
corruption at all levels, the government introduced additional measures in its 2009-2010 
program. These measures include the further improvement of the legal framework, the 
strengthening of state bodies in the fight against corruption, especially the police and 
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USKOK, strengthening international cooperation, the prevention of conflicts of interest, 
and further education of judges and court officials.
208
 
 
6.4. Further improvements in the judiciary 
Croatia has made some improvements in the judiciary in the past years, and this was also 
recognized in the latest EU report on Croatia. The EU has confirmed that progress has 
been made in many areas, and especially in the field of the rule of law. In general, the 
number of case backlogs has decreased, the criteria for the appointment of judges and 
prosecutors has become more transparent and the length of court proceedings has been 
reduced. Moreover, Kosor‟s government has made further progress in the handling of war 
crimes issues, by reviewing various doubtful 1990‟s ‘in absentia’ verdicts.209 However, 
the EU report has also pointed out the specific issues that need to be closely addressed 
before the closure of the Chapter 23. Thus, in order to strengthen the rule of law and to 
increase professionalism in the judiciary, the Parliament amended and adopted a new 
package of laws in the period 2009-2011, including: the Law on Courts, the State 
Judiciary Council Act, the State Attorney Offices Act and the State School for Judicial 
Officials Act, as well as the Judicial Reform Strategy for 2011-2015 period. With this in 
mind, the recruitment of judges and prosecutors has become more transparent and 
disciplinary proceedings in the judiciary are further enhanced. 
 Moreover, in order to improve efficiency of the judiciary and to reduce the overall 
case backlog, the government has strengthened the administrative capacity of the most 
burdened courts, such as the Municipal Civil Court in Zagreb, the Municipal Court in 
Split, the County Court in Zagreb, and several others. According to the Ministry of 
Justice Report, the number of backlogs at the end of 2004 was 1,640,365 cases, reduced 
by the end of 2008 to 886,872 cases, while at the end of 2010 this number was further 
reduced to 785,561 cases, which is reduction of more than 50 per cent in five years. At 
the same time, the number of municipal courts was reduced by 35 per cent, and of state 
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attorney‟s offices by 23 per cent.210 From December 2009 to December 2010, Croatia 
further reduced the backlog of cases from 795,722 to 785,561 cases, which is reduction 
of 1.3 per cent.
211
 The implementation of necessary measures, such as the reduction of 
the backlog of cases, especially of old civil cases, shortening the duration of court 
procedures, and the rationalization of the municipal courts and state attorney‟s offices 
network can increase the efficiency of the judiciary in the coming years. In addition, the 
further education of judges and court officials, as well as the establishment of 
comprehensive Free Legal Assistance for the most vulnerable part of the population 
largely contributed to positive EU reports and has brought some encouraging changes to 
Croatian judicial system.  
At the same time, the Croatian judicial system continued working on war crimes 
issues, throughout investigations and prosecutions of all domestic war crimes regardless 
of the ethnicity and the rank of the perpetrators. In order to improve the handling of 
domestic war crimes issues, the government also adopted a set of strategic and 
operational documents and plans, which was completed in February 2011, with the 
„Strategy for the Investigation and Prosecution of War Crimes Committed in the period 
1991-1995‟. In addition, specialized war crime chambers as well as war crime divisions 
have been established in Zagreb, Rijeka, Split, and Osijek. The option of transferring 
cases to other courts in order to avoid possible implications of partiality and pressures 
from the local community, has further strengthened the quality of procedures. Regional 
cooperation in regard to war crime issues has improved as well. Moreover, in 2009 
Branimir Glavaš was sentenced to 10 years in prison for war crimes committed against 
Serb population in Osijek in 1991. Furthermore, although he ran away to Herzegovina, 
Glavaš was arrested and is now serving his sentence there, in Zenica prison. This also 
proves the enhanced regional cooperation on war crime issues. In addition, the close 
cooperation between the regional State Attorney‟s Offices resulted in investigation 
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against 23 and indictments against 19 Serbian citizens for committing war crimes on the 
Croatian territory against the Croat population.
212
 
 
6.5. Fundamental rights and freedom of expression 
At the same time, the country has made considerable progress in the field of fundamental 
rights. According to an EU report, the general legal framework for human rights 
protection has been improved, as well as access to justice, and freedom of expression. 
There has been progress in regard to the protection of national minorities, especially the 
Serb and Roma minorities. Moreover, a number of measures were taken in order to 
increase tolerance in the society. However, a lot of issues still remain to be addressed, 
such as: housing care and refugee return in the case of the Serb minority as well as 
difficult living conditions and pre-school education in the case of the Roma minority. In 
addition, it is important to increase the level of employment of national minorities in the 
wider public sector where they remain underrepresented, according to an EC Report.
213
 
Furthermore, in 2010 the government introduced a new measure regarding the 
house care beneficiaries and former tenancy rights holders, outside areas of special state 
care. The new measure allows this group to purchase housing units at a price that is much 
lower than the market price. However, it remains important to increase economic 
possibilities in the areas of special state care that largely lag behind other parts of the 
country. The returnees to these areas are still facing problems of reconstruction of roads, 
water supply and electricity infrastructure as well as difficulties in finding jobs and in 
access to health services. In regard to the Roma minority, the government has taken 
several steps to improve their position in the society, such as: the fight against 
discrimination, the struggle for the preservation of traditional Roma culture, and 
upgrading Roma education, health care, employment, and housing. At the same time, the 
number of Roma children in the pre-school education has increased from 350 in 
2005/2006 to 734 in 2009/2010, while the number of Roma children in primary schools 
has quadrupled from 1,013 in 2005/2006 to 4,186 in 2009/2010. Moreover, a total 
number of 283 Roma pupils in high-schools and 25 Roma students in universities receive 
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scholarships from the Croatian government.
214
 In order to address the remaining issues of 
national minorities, the government has also adopted the Action Plan on the 
implementation of the Constitutional Act on the Rights of National Minorities for the 
2011-2013 period and the Action Plan on the employment of national minorities in state 
administration bodies for the 2011-2014 period. 
At the same time, the media are generally perceived as independent from political 
influence, especially on the national level. However, there are still some concerns about 
political influence on the local media by the local governments. In addition, the owner‟s 
influence on media‟s editorial policies is increasing, which contradicts the basic idea that 
media should be independent, not only from governments but also from their owners. In 
Croatia, the Europapress Holding (EPH) is one of the biggest media companies, 
publishing more than 30 newspapers and publications, such as Jutarnji list, Slobodna 
Dalmacija and Globus. It is 50 per cent owned by German Westdeutsche Allgemeine 
Zeitung (WAZ). At the same time, Austrian company Styria Media Group owns Večernji 
list, 24 sata and Poslovni dnevnik. 
Thus, freedom of expression, pluralism and diversity are in general threatened by 
the concentration of the media ownership. In order to avoid this, media control as well as 
ownership should be widespread. It is not a surprise then that, according to Freedom 
House, the index on independent media in the past years has even worsened, and in 2010 
it was 4.00, signifying partly free media. The main reason for this was the growing 
interconnectedness among politicians, big business and media interests which creates less 
opportunity for investigative journalism and further reduces the quality of the media.
215
 
Although it is hard to expect absolutely fair and disinterested journalism in the private 
media, there is an urgent need to improve the present situation. Moreover, commercial 
networks have also contributed to the commercialization of the media space. Television 
and the tabloid press are becoming increasingly important and the media in general are 
failing to inform the people about political processes in the country that are of great 
importance. 
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6.6. Kosor’s prime ministership: Summarizing the main features 
At this point, since Kosor‟s term in office is still in progress, it is difficult to reach a final 
verdict on her prime ministership. However, it is possible to observe certain 
developments in the past two years. After reaching an agreement with Slovenia on how to 
solve the border dispute, which led to the unblocking of Croatia‟s accession negotiations, 
Croatia‟s international position has been further strengthened. At the same time, the 
efforts the government has put in the fight against corruption are greater than ever, as 
well as the results, which were also recognized by international actors, such as the EU. 
Positive changes have also occurred in the field of the judiciary and fundamental rights. 
However, economic problems remain largely unsolved, which resulted in strong anti-
government protests at the beginning of 2011. Moreover, only 13.7 per cent of the public 
supports the work of government at this point, which is mostly related to citizens‟ 
frustration with the economic situation in the country.
216
 Therefore, economic problems 
remain the government‟s most important challenge in the near future. In addition, the 
government‟s commitment regarding its cooperation with the ICTY‟s cooperation 
remains an important condition for Croatia‟s EU membership. 
At this point, it is possible to conclude that the EU‟s political conditionality had a 
strong impact during Kosor‟s term in office, especially in the last phase of Croatia‟s 
accession negotiations and in regard to fight against corruption. Besides, the EU‟s 
pressure resulted in the government‟s adoption of entire set of new laws and regulations 
in the areas covered in the Chapter 23. Furthermore, having in mind Linz‟s and Stepan‟s 
as well as Schedler‟s measurement criteria, is it possible to argue that Croatia is 
functioning as a consolidated democracy for some years now. Moreover, the question of 
democratic consolidation, at least as Schedler perceives it, is no longer an issue. There is 
no danger of silent erosion of democracy in Croatia, and especially there is no possibility 
for democracy to break down. Thus, it is possible to argue that democracy has become 
„the only game in town‟ and is here to stay. In that sense, Kosor‟s government‟s task is to 
take another step forward and continue working on the quality of democracy. 
 
                                                 
216
 HRT, 5 May 2011, 'Vladi niska ocjena i potpora', 
http://www.hrt.hr/index.php?id=ispis&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=114757&cHash=49ad7bc600 (accessed in May 
2011) 
 76 
7. Conclusion 
 
Having in mind the country‟s specific features, such as the war of independence and the 
legacy of Croatia‟s first president Franjo Tudjman, this thesis has assessed the democratic 
consolidation in Croatia within the context of the EU accession negotiations in the past 
decade. The thesis has analyzed major challenges the country has faced and looked 
specifically at the impact of the EU enlargement policies and the political conditionality 
approach on democratic consolidation in Croatia. In addition, it has observed how have 
different Croatian governments responded to various EU requirements and considered 
whether the EU political conditionality approach has been an effective tool in promoting 
democratic change and consolidation in the country. Thus, the thesis has considered the 
state of play in the following areas particularly: cooperation with the ICTY, the fight 
against corruption, the consolidation of an independent judiciary, and fundamental rights, 
with special attention to freedom of expression. These issues clearly indicate the 
importance of the rule of law, which is crucial for consolidation of democracy. Moreover, 
these particular issues have often been pointed out as areas Croatia needs to handle 
correctly in order to join the EU and, at the same time, have been for many governments 
painful to deal with. 
In this thesis, I have argued that EU‟s enlargements policies and political 
conditionality approach had a significant impact on democratic changes and 
consolidation in the country. In my view, some of the issues that are crucial for country‟s 
democratic consolidation, such as the rule of law and the fight against corruption, were 
closely addressed only after the EU has exerted its pressure on Croatian governments. 
This was the case both prior to official opening of accession negotiations when the EU 
had pressed Sanader‟s government to fully cooperate with the ICTY, as well as prior to 
foreseeable closing of accession negotiations, when the EU has pushed Kosor‟s 
government to deal more efficiently with corruption issues.  
Furthermore, due to domestic pressures of various interest groups, such as 
veteran‟s movements, Croatian governments have often been unwilling to proceed with 
necessary political and social reforms and have resisted fulfilling the EU‟s membership 
conditions. Thus, the governments‟ hesitation to introduce necessary democratic reforms 
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has for a long time presented an important obstacle to substantial changes and 
consolidation of the country, as well as to Croatia‟s EU membership. This was also 
evident during Raĉan‟s government term, when Raĉan and his coalition partners, due to 
mass protests of veteran‟s movements and strong resistance of Croatian citizens, were 
reluctant to comply with the EU requirements to fully cooperate with the ICTY. The 
main coalition partner‟s threat to leave the government was another reason for lack of 
compliance with the EU‟s membership conditions. Apparently, domestic adoption costs 
were higher than actual EU incentives, which also confirms that the EU‟s success or 
failure regarding its impact on democratic changes and consolidation in particular 
country depends on the country‟s willingness to accept or resist European policies. There 
are no doubts that both Raĉan‟s and Sanader‟s governments made some important steps 
forward. However, there was a significant gap between reforms adopted and actual 
implementation during this period of time.  
In addition, Croatia‟s war of independence and Tudjman‟s personality and style of 
governance were the center of focus during the 1990s, rather than democratic reforms. 
This had slowed down democratic changes and consolidation in the country for a whole 
decade. Due to specific war circumstances, the country did not achieve its territorial 
integrity until 1998, and the opportunity for the consolidation of democracy only opened 
after the 2000 elections, when liberal parties took over power.  
Finally, although some authors argue that the enlargement policies have not 
changed much in the past years, it is possible to observe that the EU‟s approach has 
evolved. The EU wants a potential member state to entirely measure up all the accession 
criteria even prior to formal membership and thus, Croatia had to fulfill different 
standards that had not been previously required. On the one hand, the EU‟s approach has 
encouraged the country to deal more efficiently with the enforcement of necessary 
political and social reforms, and has to some extent signified the possible EU‟s position 
toward other Southeast European countries. On the other hand, it has often eroded 
Croatian citizens‟ support for EU membership, and perhaps not always sent a clear signal 
to Croatia as well as other Southeast European countries that the membership is reachable 
once the country introduces all necessary democratic reforms. It is crucial for the EU‟s 
requirements to be credible, which means transparent, determinate and consistent. 
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However, this has not always been the case. Although majority of EU requirements were 
clearly stipulated, some of them, such as „full cooperation with the ICTY‟ were rather 
vague and subject to different interpretations and additional extensions. This also makes 
governments less willing to take necessary democratic reforms and comply with EU 
membership conditions, since the potential benefits get further postponed. At this point, 
any further postponement of the closing of Croatia‟s accession negotiations could result 
in adverse effects, such as further decline in citizens‟ support for EU membership, as well 
as in neighboring countries‟ disillusion that the EU membership is possible in the 
foreseeable future. It could also send a signal that the EU‟s approach is not completely 
functioning, and thus have impact on other Southeast European countries in terms of lack 
of adoption and implementation of necessary democratic reforms. 
Having all this in mind, it is possible to argue that, measured by Linz‟s and 
Stepan‟s as well as Schedler‟s behavioral, attitudinal and constitutional criteria, Croatia 
today is a stable and consolidated democracy, to which EU enlargement policies and 
political conditionality have significantly contributed. Although there are still many 
problems to resolve and issues to address, especially in terms of fight against corruption 
and war crimes issues, there is no direct threat from democratic breakdown or erosion of 
democracy in the country. In other words, in spite of some doubts and dissatisfactions 
regarding the quality of democracy, the fear that the democratic process could be stopped 
or eroded no longer exists. Thus, it is possible to argue that democracy in Croatia has 
become „the only game in town‟. However, the country will also have to overcome 
possible challenges in regard to changing values, which is also an important element of 
democracy. Therefore, the important issue for Kosor‟s and any other future government 
is the quality of democracy, especially since democracy is an ongoing process that must 
be kept alive and always additionally reinforced. 
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Appendix I: Croatian modern history – Chronology 
 
January 1990 –  the League of Communists of Croatia joined the League of Communists  
 of Slovenia in withdrawing from the League of Communists of  
 Yugoslavia. 
May 1990 –  the first multiparty parliamentary elections held in Croatia, victory by  
 the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and Franjo Tudjman. 
August 1990 –  Serbian separatist forces joined with Belgrade, set up barricades along  
 highways around Knin area in Croatia, initiating a rebellion. 
October 1990 –  Croatian and Slovenian proposal of reorganization of Yugoslavia as a  
 confederation. The proposal was ignored by Serbian side. 
22 Dec 1990 –  the Croatian Parliament (Sabor) adopted a new constitution (known as  
 the Christmas Constitution – Božićni Ustav). 
February 1991 – Serb separatist forces in Croatia declared their secession from Croatia. 
19 May 1991 –  Croatia carried out a referendum on independence, where 95.74 per cent  
 of voters voted for independence. 
25 June 1991 –  Croatia declared its independence. 
3 July 1991 –  occupation of the Baranja region of Eastern Slavonia by the Yugoslav  
 People‟s Army. This act is treated as formal beginning of the war in  
 Croatia. 
8 Oct 1991 –  Croatia dissolved all state relations with the former Socialist Federal  
 Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and became an independent state. 
15 Jan 1992 –  the European Union (EU) recognized Croatia‟s independence. 
May 1992 –  admission of Croatia to the United Nations (UN). 
May 1995 –  Operation Flash (Operacija Bljesak) –military action carried out by 
  Croatian Army and police forces in Western Slavonia, in order to regain  
 control over areas occupied by Serb separatist forces. 
August 1995 –  Operation Storm (Operacija Oluja) –military action carried out by 
 Croatian Army and police forces in the so-called „Krajina region‟ in 
  order to regain control over areas occupied by Serb separatist forces.  
12 Nov 1995 –  Erdut agreement (Erdutski sporazum) between Croatian government  
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 and the local Serb authorities about peaceful reintegration of Danube  
 region (Podunavlje) under Croatian territorial integrity and sovereignty. 
21 Nov 1995 –  Dayton Peace Agreement signed, ending the 1990‟s wars. 
May 1999 -  The European Commission (EC) proposes the creation of the  
 Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) for Albania, Bosnia-
 Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and the FR of Yugoslavia. 
Dec 1999 –  death of President Franjo Tudjman. 
January 2000 –  a coalition led by the SDP won the  parliamentary elections and the SDP 
 leader Ivica Raĉan became the new prime minister. 
January 2000 –  Stjepan Mesić elected to a five-year term as second president of Croatia. 
29 Oct 2001 –  The Stabilization and Association Agreement signed in Luxembourg. 
18 Dec 2002 –  The Croatian Parliament accepted the Resolution on the Accession of  
 the Republic of Croatia to the European Union. 
21 Feb 2003 –  Croatia applied for the membership in the European Union. 
Nov 2003 –  HDZ led by Ivo Sanader won parliamentary elections and Sanader  
 became the new prime minister. 
18 June 2004 –  Croatia was granted the status of an official EU candidate country. 
January 2005 –  Stjepan Mesić elected to a second five-year term as president of Croatia. 
1 Feb 2005 –  The Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) entered into force. 
3 Oct 2005 –  The launch of accession negotiations between Croatia and the EU. 
Nov 2007 –  Croatian parliamentary elections, victory of HDZ and Ivo Sanader; 
 Second term in office, supported by HSS, HSLS and national minorities.  
April 2009 –  Croatia joined the NATO. 
July 2009 –  Resignation of Ivo Sanader, Jadranka Kosor took over as the new prime  
 minister of Croatia. 
January 2010 –  Ivo Josipović elected as the third Croatian president. 
15 April 2011 –  The ICTY sentenced Croatian generals Ante Gotovina and Mladen  
 Markaĉ for committing crimes against humanity in Operation Storm. 
 
Source: Constitutional Court of Republic of Croatia official website, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
European Integration of Republic of Croatia (MFAEI) official website, and Sabrina P. Ramet and Davorka 
Matić (eds.) Democratic Transition in Croatia. 
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Appendix II: Referendum and Election Results 1991-2011 
 
1. Results of the referendum on status of the Republic of Croatia, 19 May 1991: 
Question: Do you support that the Republic of Croatia as a sovereign and independent 
state, which guarantees cultural autonomy and all civil rights to Serbs and members of 
other nationalities in Croatia, can join into an alliance of modern states with other 
republics? 
 
 Votes Votes in percentages % 
Voted 3, 008, 206 82.37 
Invalid ballots 36, 055 1.20 
Valid ballots 2, 972, 151 98.80 
FOR 2, 845, 521 95.74 
AGAINST 126, 630 4.26 
Total 2, 972, 151 100.00 
 
2. Results of the first multi-party elections in Croatia, 22 April 1990: 
The number of registered voters: 3, 544, 112 
The number of votes: 2, 989, 443 (84.35%) 
 
1
217
 2 3 (%) 4 5 (%) 
HDZ 1, 196, 059 41.61 55 68.75 
SKH-SDP/SS-
SSH/SSOH 
1, 015, 895 35.34 20 25.00 
KNS 439, 372 15.29 3 3.75 
SDS 46, 418 1.61 1 1.25 
Independent – Hrvoje 
Kačić 
25, 690 0.89 1 1.25 
Total  2, 874, 286* 100,0 80** 100.00 
*The number includes the votes for minor parties that have not obtained seats in the parliament, and thus I 
have not included them in this table. 
**There was 1 non-attached member of the parliament, and all together 4 representatives of national 
minorities. 
                                                 
217
 1. Name of party or coalition, 2. Votes cast to candidates, 3. Votes cast to candidates, in percentages, 4. 
Distribution of seats in the Parliament, 5. Distribution of seats in the Parliament, in percentages. 
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3. Results of Parliamentary elections in Croatia, 2 August 1992: 
The number of registered voters: 3, 558, 913 
The number of votes: 2, 690, 873 (75.61%) 
 
1 2 3 (%) 4 5 (%) 
HDZ  1, 176, 437  44.71  85 61.59  
HSLS 466, 356  17.72  14 10.14  
HSP 186, 000  7.07  5 3.62  
HNS 176, 214  6.70  6 4.35  
SDP 145, 419  5.53  11 7.97  
HSS 111, 869  4.25  3 2.17  
IDS/DA/RDS 83, 623 3.18 6 4.35 
SNS 28, 620 1.09 3 2.17 
Total 2, 631, 535* 100.00 138** 100.00 
*The number includes the votes for minor parties that have not obtained seats in the parliament, and thus I 
have not included them in this table. 
**There were also 5 non-attached members of the parliament (not included in the table), and all together 5 
representatives of national minorities. 
 
 
4. Results of Parliamentary elections, 29 October 1995: 
The number of registered voters: 3, 634, 233 
The number of votes: 2, 500, 040 (68.79%) 
 
1 2 3 (%) 4 5 (%) 
HDZ 1, 093, 403  45.23  75 59.06  
HSS/IDS/HNS/HKDU/SBHS  441, 390  18.26  14 11.02 
HSLS 279, 245 11.55 12 9.45 
SDP 215, 839  8.93 10 7.87 
HSP 121, 095  5.01 4 3.15 
IDS - - 4 3.15 
HND 72, 612  3.00 1 0.79 
ASH 40, 348  1.67 1 0.79 
SNS - - 2 1.57 
Total 2, 427, 374* 100.00 127** 100.00 
*The number includes the votes for minor parties that have not obtained seats in the parliament, and thus I 
have not included them in this table. 
**There were also 4 non-attached members of the parliament (not included in the table), and all together 12 
representatives of „diaspora‟ and 7 of national minorities. 
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5. Results of Parliamentary elections in Croatia, 3 January 2000: 
The number of registered voters: 3, 686, 378 
The number of votes: 2, 821, 020 (76.53%) 
 
1 2 3 (%) 4 5 (%) 
SDP/HSLS/PGS/SBHS  
SDP 
HSLS 
PGS 
SBHS 
1, 133, 136  40.84  (-) 
44 
24 
2 
1 
(-) 
29.14 
15.89 
1.32 
0.66 
HDZ 676, 264  24.38  46 30.46 
HSS/IDS/HNS/LS 
HSS 
IDS 
HNS 
LS 
431, 484  15.55  (-) 
17 
4 
2 
2 
(-) 
11.26 
2.65 
1.32 
1.32 
HSP/HKDU  146, 496  5.28  5 3.31 
SNS - - 1 0.66 
Total 2, 774, 280* 100.00 151** 100.00 
*The number includes the votes for minor parties that have not obtained seats in the parliament, and thus I 
have not included them in this table. 
**There were 3 also non-attached members of the parliament (not included in the table), and all together 6 
representatives of „diaspora‟ and 5 of national minorities. 
 
6. Results of Parliamentary elections in Croatia, 23 November 2003: 
The number of registered voters: 3, 690, 936 
The number of votes: 2, 466, 481 (66.83%) 
 
1 2 3 (%) 4 5 (%) 
HDZ 800, 503  33.23 66 43.42  
SDP/IDS/Libra/LS  
SDP 
IDS 
Libra 
LS 
560, 593  23.26 (-) 
34 
4 
3 
2 
(-) 
22.37 
2.63 
1.97 
1.32 
HNS/PGS/SBHS 198, 781  8.25 11 7.24 
HSS  174, 960  7.26 10 6.58 
HSP 155, 588  6.46 8 5.26 
HSLS/DC 99, 467  4.13 3 1.98 
HSU 98, 299  4.08 3 1.97 
HDSS/HDC/DPS  23, 787  0.99 1 0.66 
SDSS  - - 3 1.97 
Total 2, 409, 240* 100.00 152** 100.00 
*The number includes the votes for minor parties that have not obtained seats in the parliament, and thus I 
have not included them in this table. 
**There were also 4 non-attached members of the parliament (not included in the table), and all together 4 
representatives of „diaspora‟ and 8 of national minorities. 
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7. Results of Parliamentary elections in Croatia, 25 November 2007: 
The number of registered voters: 3, 824, 731 
The number of votes: 2, 425, 269 (63.41) 
 
1 2 3 (%) 4 5 (%) 
HDZ 834, 203  34.91 66 43.14 
SDP 776, 656  32.50 56 36.60 
HNS 168, 439  7.05 7 4.58 
HSS/HSLS 161, 813  6.77 8 5.23 
HSU 101, 091  4.23 1 0.65 
HSP 83, 006  3.47 1 0.65 
HDSSB 44, 552  1.86 3 1.96 
IDS 38, 267  1.60 3 1.96 
SDSS 9, 115  0.38 3 1.96 
Total 2, 389, 391* 100.00 153** 100.00 
*The number includes the votes for minor parties that have not obtained seats in the parliament, and thus I 
have not included them into this table. 
**There were also 5 non-attached members of the parliament (not included in the table), and all together 5 
representatives of „diaspora‟ and 8 of national minorities. 
 
 
8. Results of Presidential elections in Croatia, 2 August 1992: 
First round: 
The number of registered voters: 3,575,032 
The number of votes: 2,677,764 (74.90%) 
 
Candidates Number of votes Percentage (%) 
1. Franjo Tudjman (HDZ) 1, 519, 100 56.73 
2. Dražen Budiša (HSLS) 585, 535 21.87 
3. Savka Dabčević-Kučar (HNS) 161, 242 6.02 
4. Dobroslav Paraga (HSP) 144, 695 5.40 
5. Silvije Degen (SSH) 108, 979 4.07 
*There were 8 candidates, the rest of the candidates have obtained less than 4 per cent of votes. Tudjman 
had won in the first round. 
 
9. Results of Presidential elections in Croatia, 15 June 1997: 
First round: 
The number of registered voters: 4,061,479 
The number of votes: 2,218,448 (54.62%) 
 
Candidates Number of votes Percentage (%) 
1. Franjo Tudjman (HDZ) 1, 337, 990 61.41 
2. Zdravko Tomac (SDP) 458, 172 21.03 
3. Vlado Gotovac (HSLS) 382, 630 17.56 
*Tudjman had won in the first round. 
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10. Results of Presidential elections in Croatia, 25 January 2000: 
 
First round: 
The number of registered voters: 4, 251, 109 
The number of votes: 2,677,561 (62.98 %) 
 
Candidates Number of votes Percentage (%) 
1. Stjepan Mesić (HNS) 1, 100, 671 41.11 
2. Dražen Budiša (HSLS, SDP) 741, 837 27.71 
3. Dr. Mate Granić (HDZ) 601, 588 22.47 
4. Slaven Letica (Independent) 110, 782 4.14 
5. Ante Đapić (HSP) 49, 288 1.84 
*There were 9 candidates, the rest of the candidates have obtained less than 1 per cent of votes. 
 
 
Second round: 
The number of registered voters: 4, 252, 921 
The number of votes: 2, 598, 120 (60.88%) 
 
Candidates Number of votes Percentage (%) 
1. Stjepan Mesić (HNS, HSS, 
LS, IDS, ASH) 
1, 433, 372 56.01 
2. Dražen Budiša (HSLS, SDP) 1, 125, 969 43.99 
 
11. Results of Presidential elections in Croatia, 2 January 2005: 
First round: 
The number of registered voters: 4, 251, 109 
The number of votes: 2,677,561 (62.98 %) 
 
Candidates Number of votes Percentage (%) 
1. Stjepan Mesić (SDP, HNS, 
HSS, IDS, Libra, LS, PGS, SDA) 
1, 089, 398 48.92 
2. Jadranka Kosor (HDZ) 452, 218 20.31 
3. Boris Mikšić (Independent) 396, 093 17.79 
4. Đurđa Adlešić (HSLS) 59, 795 2.68 
5. Dr. Slaven Letica(Independent) 57, 748 2.59 
6. Ljubo Ćesić (Independent) 41, 216 1.85 
7. Ivić Pašalić (Hrvatski blok) 40, 637 1.82 
*There were 13 candidates, the rest of the candidates have obtained less than 1 per cent of votes. 
 
 
Second round: 
The number of registered voters: 4, 392, 220 
The number of votes: 2, 241, 760 (51.04 %) 
 
Candidates Number of votes Percentage (%) 
1. Stjepan Mesić (SDP, HNS, 
HSS, IDS, Libra, LS, PGS, SDA) 
1, 454, 451 65.93 
2. Jadranka Kosor (HDZ) 751, 692  34.07 
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12. Results of Presidential elections in Croatia, 27 December 2009: 
First round: 
The number of registered voters: 4, 495, 233 
The number of votes: 1, 975, 909 (43.96 %) 
 
Candidates Number of votes Percentage (%) 
1. Dr. Ivo Josipović (SDP) 640, 594 32.42 
2. Milan Bandić (Independent) 293, 068 14.83 
3. Andrija Hebrang (HDZ) 237, 998 12.04 
4. Nadan Vidošević (Independent) 223, 892 11.33 
5. Vesna Pusić (HNS) 143, 190 7.25 
6. Dragan Primorac (Indep.) 117, 154 5.93 
7. Dr. Miroslav Tudjman (Indep.) 80, 784 4.09 
*There were 12 candidates, the rest of the candidates have obtained less than 4 per cent of votes. 
 
Second round: 
The number of registered voters: 4, 495, 528 
The number of votes: 2, 253, 154 (50.12 %) 
 
Candidates Number of votes Percentage (%) 
1. Dr. Ivo Josipović (SDP) 1, 339, 385 60.26 
2. Milan Bandić (Independent) 883, 222 39.74 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: State Election Commission (Drţavno izborno povjerenstvo, DIP), available at 
http://www.izbori.hr/arhiva/arhiva.html (accessed in May 2011). 
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Appendix III: Short biographies of political and societal actors 1991-2011 
 
Dr. Franjo Tudjman (1922-1999) – an intellectual, a scientist and a politician as well as 
the first president of Croatia as an independent state. Tudjman was also an ex Partisan 
and the youngest JNA general. During the 1960‟s, he was a highly placed member of 
Croatia‟s communist elite and Director of the Institute for the History, a major research 
institution that was often perceived as a parallel political centre. In 1967, he was purged 
and put under detention because of his anti-totalitarian political views. In the first 
multiparty elections in Croatia in 1990, Tudjman and his party the HDZ won, and shortly 
after Tudjman became the first president of an independent Croatia. He was reelected 
twice and remained in power until his death in December 1999. 
 
Ivica Račan (1943-2007) – actively involved in politics for more than 30 years. Raĉan 
had obtained high-duties in socialist Yugoslavia. First, he was a member and later a 
chairman of the Croatian League of Communists. In 1990, he was a leader of Croatian 
delegation in the 14
th
 Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, when both 
Slovenian and Croatian delegation left the Congress after they were voted down by 
Slobodan Milošević‟s supporters. Few months later, Raĉan had organized the first 
multiparty elections in Croatia. Under Raĉan‟s leadership, the communist party had 
transformed itself into a left-oriented democratic and socialist party, SDP. After ten years 
in opposition, the SDP-HSLS coalition won the 2000 parliamentary elections and Raĉan 
became the new Croatian prime minister.  
 
Stjepan Mesić (b.1934) – a high-ranking communist and the last president of socialist 
Yugoslavia. In 1967, when a group of Croatian intellectuals published the Declaration on 
Croatian language, Mesić denounced it as an attack against Yugoslavia and called for 
authors‟ prosecution. However, in 1974 he was sentenced and spend one year in „Stara 
Gradiška‟ prison for supporting the Croatian spring movement, which called for Croatia‟s 
equity within Yugoslavia. In the early 1990‟s, as a member of the HDZ, Mesić held a 
position of a Croatian prime minister and then a speaker of the Parliament. In 1994 he left 
the ruling party, and in 1997 became a member of the Croatian People‟s Party. In the 
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2000 presidential elections, Mesić was elected the new Croatian president. In 2005, he 
was reelected for his second term in office. 
 
Dr. Ivo Sanader (b.1953) – a politician and a prominent HDZ member. During the 
1980‟s he lived in Austria and worked as a journalist and a private entrepreneur. Since 
Croatia‟s independence, he obtained several duties, such as: the minister of science and 
technology, deputy minister of foreign affairs and head of the office of the prime 
minister. In 2000, Sanader was elected leader of the HDZ and, after winning the 2003 
parliamentary elections, came back to power and became the new prime minister of 
Croatia. In the 2007 parliamentary elections, Sanader was reelected for his second term in 
office. In 2009, he unexpectedly resigned a prime minister‟s position.  
 
Jadranka Kosor (b.1953) – a former journalist and a politician, as well as the first female 
prime minister since Croatia‟s independence. During the early 1990‟s Kosor worked as a 
journalist covering war topics, such as refugees‟ and war veterans‟ problems. In 1995, 
Kosor became a member of the HDZ as well as a member of the Parliament. After 2000, 
she became a vice-president of the HDZ, and in the 2005 presidential elections Kosor 
was the party‟s candidate. In both Sanader‟s governments, she was a vice-president of the 
government and a minister for family, veterans and inter-generational solidarity. After 
Sanader‟s resignation in July 2009, Kosor became both the president of the ruling HDZ 
and the new Croatian prime minister.  
 
Dr. Ivo Josipović (b.1957) – a university professor, a legal expert and a composer. 
Josipović had entered politics as a member of the League of Communists of Croatia, and 
with Raĉan made an important contribution to democratization of the party. In 1994, he 
left politics, but came back in 2003 as an independent member of the Parliament and was 
reelected in the 2007 parliamentary elections. In the 2010 presidential elections, as the 
SDP candidate, Josipović became the third Croatian president. 
 
 
Source: Official web sites: the Office of the President of Croatia, the Government of the Republic of 
Croatia, the Croatian Democratic Union, the Social Democratic Party of Croatia. 
